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REDEFINING STEWARDSHIP OVER BODY PARTS 
ELIZABETH E. APPEL BLUE* 
“And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept . . . or 
whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate 
towards another paradigm . . . .” 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (3d ed. 1958) (translated by 
G.E.M. Anscombe), at ¶ 385 (p.118e). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today’s society struggles with organ shortages.1  Exacerbating the problem is the 
absence of a universally accepted paradigm for how justly to treat body parts, such as 
                                                                
*B.A. 1990, Yale College; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School; M.A., Bioethics, 2007, University 
of Virginia.  Many thanks to Robert Blue, Andrea Bjorklund, and William Murray for their 
invaluable editorial assistance on earlier versions of this article, and thanks to my family for 
their love, patience, and support.  Thanks also to James Childress for his suggestions regarding 
research and comments on an early outline. 
1The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), for example, reported a waiting list of 
92,587 as of August 15, 2006, with a total of 12,002 transplants from January to May of 2006 
and 6122 donors in that same period.  See http://www.unos.org.  These numbers are “dynamic 
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organs and tissue.  Scholarly tomes are filled with articles addressing this subject.  
Yet confusion still reigns.  Limited framing of the question that requires acceptance 
of either a property/market paradigm or altruistic donor paradigm has failed to lead 
to a solution, as neither the property nor altruistic solutions are universally accepted.  
Further, many compromise solutions also fall short as they are either impractical 
legislative solutions with no realistic chance of implementation or small, piecemeal, 
too little, too late experiments.  Similarly, the case law addressing body parts imparts 
a sense of disorder and bewilderment.  The law is at a loss as to how to address body 
parts consistently.  This failure to reach a generally acceptable solution to the 
treatment of body parts can be seen as a “failure of [our] imagination.”2  
This paper proposes one possible avenue for defining a framework to address 
body parts.  I begin with the presumption that given the increasing use of body parts 
outside of our bodies, either after death or during life, society requires a framework 
with institutions and rules to govern our body parts.  Yet there is no settled 
framework.  Much of the controversy over differing approaches stems from whether 
people should be able to sell body parts.  Thus, each potential framework implicitly 
addresses the question of monetary value.  While multiple possibilities exist, the 
predominant models are (1) property, most often meaning ownership that permits 
monetary compensation; (2) stewardship, implying altruism and no monetary 
compensation to the donor; and (3) a compromise solution involving regulatory 
bodies, which could assign monetary value under certain circumstances.   
Each approach suffers from multiple shortcomings.  Yet each has its strengths.  
For example, the need for rules drives, in part, the attraction to a market and property 
paradigm, with its long-standing and familiar institutions and rules.3  Yet property is 
not an exact match, and significant long-term problems regarding how we conceive 
of ourselves may develop if our legal conceptions of property are mapped directly 
onto our bodies.  Stewardship is a competing concept often relied upon, but it lacks 
the institutions and rules that the property concept provides.  As a vague and 
amorphous ethical concept, stewardship is poorly suited to be a consistent guide in 
                                                           
and change[] throughout the year.”  INST. OF MEDICINE, ORGAN DONATION, 1, 46 (James F. 
Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman, eds., 2006) [hereinafter ORGAN DONATION].  While some 
candidates may have multiple registrations, regardless of how numbers are tallied, plainly, in 
economic terms, organ supply falls far short of demand, and each year many individuals die 
waiting for a transplant.  Id. at 1-2, 45-46.  The vast majority of these individuals–more than 
70 percent–are in need of kidneys.  Id. at 2, 46.   
2Salman Rushdie used this phrase in discussing the Islamic and Judeo-Christian word’s 
understandings of each other in an interview with Bill Moyers in Public Broadcasting’s 
Reason and Faith series.  Interview by Bill Moyers with Salman Rushdie (June 23, 2006) 
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/faithandreason/print/faithandreason101_ 
print.html).  See also DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 17 (1991) (explaining 
how “paradoxes that beset traditional philosophical debates about . . . the nature of the self or 
ego and its relation to thoughts and sensations . . . arise from failures of the imagination”) 
(italics in original). 
3And, as discussed, infra in Sections III.A and IV, we also use our bodies, in part, as a way 
of defining both our privacy and property rights in relationship to others and to the state.  See 
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 365 n.15 (2000).  
For that reason, there is a natural inclination to associate them as “ours.”  And, in some sense, 
they are more ours than any other object in the world.  The dilemma is that they are more than 
an object that belongs to us–they also constitute our subjectivity. 
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the evolving reality of a marketplace of human tissue and other body parts.4  Markets 
and other distribution systems require consistent off-the-rack rules, as well as ethics.  
This paper, therefore, seeks to look creatively at other bodies of law to see if they 
can be reimagined and used to give stewardship some backbone, meaning concrete 
principles that can be applied to the use of body parts.  In doing so, it seeks to 
provide a place for compensation and incentives which property provides but avoid 
some of the pitfalls of property by preserving the special place that the body has in 
defining ourselves and our humanity.  It seeks to do this by using, as a starting point, 
one of the law’s older bodies of law, agency law.  While, like so many other 
concepts, there is not an exact match with this concept either, there is the potential to 
take agency law as a starting point and fashion certain principles into a better fit than 
either property or undefined stewardship.  
The first step in the process is to review today’s treatment of body parts.  Thus, 
the second section of this paper looks at the markets surrounding the use of body 
parts.  Next it reviews a variety of approaches taken to body parts to discern what is 
appealing and what is lacking in each approach.  Then, after reviewing existing law 
and literature, this paper asks what a paradigm addressing body parts must 
accomplish.  Finally, it begins to outline how certain aspects of agency law could be 
relied upon and modified to meet the challenges facing any governing framework. 
II.  BODY PARTS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY  
“In recent history, we have seen the human body assume astonishing 
aspects of [commercial] value.”5 
Within the past several decades, modern medicine and bio-technology have 
revolutionized the uses of the human body.  Notwithstanding efforts to protect the 
body and its parts as a sacrosanct realm, markets have evolved in tissue, organs, and 
other body parts, as these “human” parts constitute the raw material in multiple 
industries.  The tissue industry over the course of a decade, for example, has evolved 
from approximately a $20 million dollar industry in the early 1990s to a billion 
dollar industry in 2003.6  And the raw component for this industry is the human 
body, which continues to increase in market value.  On average a cadaver generates 
between $30,000 to $50,000 in value, but a single cadaver can generate over 
$200,000.7 
                                                                
4Indeed, “stewardship” as a word and concept does not even have its own entry in any 
dictionary I could find.  See infra note 237 (discussing dictionaries’ treatment of stewardship). 
5Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), 
rev’d, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
6TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE:  ETHICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE xi (Stuart J. Younger, et 
al., eds., 2004); see also Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits:  Law, Capacity, and Organ 
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 387 n. 406 (2004).  
7Younger, et al. supra note 6, at 13.  See also Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits, supra note 6, at 
387 n.407 (2004) (citing Investigating Regeneration Technologies Report).  Tissue-based 
products used in spinal surgery, for example, generated approximately 300 million in revenues 
to tissue banks in 2001.  Martha W. Anderson & Scott Bottenfield, Tissue Banking–Past, 
Present, and Future, in YOUNGER, ET AL. supra note 6, at 17.   
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There are thriving markets, both licit and illicit, in the United States and abroad.8  
Regulation of these markets varies, running the spectrum from extensive to 
nonexistent.9 
Complicating the industry’s ethics is the unfortunate fact that the source of much 
of its raw material for commercial transactions is derived from body parts often 
donated by individuals or their families with altruistic motives.10  As the Inspector 
General of Health and Human Resources noted, these altruistic feelings conflict with 
the reality that their donations are the backbone of large-scale commercialized and 
often profit-driven or, at a minimum, bottom line driven industries.11  In the tissue 
industry, for example, donated skin becomes a commodity and is often applied to 
cosmetic higher dollar value products instead of what might have been envisioned by 
the donor as the most need driven purpose of, for example, aiding a burn victim.12 
Moreover, financial incentives have led to many abuses of the system.13  Multiple 
scandals have surfaced in which non-consenting donor tissue has been used to 
generate profits.14  In 1997, for example, the Los Angeles Times uncovered evidence 
that the Los Angeles coroner was illegally trafficking in body parts by selling 
corneas without consent for $335 per pair, which were then resold at $3400 per pair 
by a tissue transplant bank.15  In 2004, the David Geffen School of Medicine at 
UCLA found itself in the middle of a scandal in which cadavers donated by families 
for medical purposes (e.g., anatomy class) were being sawed into pieces and sold on 
                                                                
8For example, while, as discussed below, the sale of organs is illegal in the United States, 
foreign organ sales occur on a black market.  See, e.g., ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 274 
(describing study of 305 individuals in Chennai, India who sold their kidneys–the vast 
majority doing so in order to pay off debt); Goodwin, supra note 6, at 309; Craig S. Smith, 
Quandary in U.S. Over Use of Organs of Chinese Inmates, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001 
(describing anecdotal evidence of increasing numbers of Americans receiving transplants in 
China with organs from executed Chinese prisoners and then returning to the United States for 
follow-up care). 
9The Food and Drug Administration, for example, has only recently started registration 
and inspection requirements for tissue banks.  Goodwin, supra note 6, at 386. 
10Younger, et al., supra note 6, at 85-98.  Eighty-five percent of tissue retrieved today, 
especially bone, is processed into paste, powder, chips, and many additional configurations for 
use that the public does not traditionally associate with transplant and donor products.  Jeffrey 
Prottas, Ethics of Allocation, Lessons from Organ Procurement History, 120-138 in 
TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 6. 
11Even non-profit entities have bottom lines that must be met. 
12Goodwin, supra note 6, at 382 n.381.While many uses of tissue are legitimate and may 
be foreseen, the fact that cadaver skin is used to “enhance penis size, puff up lips, or erase 
laugh lines” and that “[p]lastic surgeons have not reported trouble obtaining skin for plastic 
surgery, but burn centers across the country are struggling to find skin to treat burn victims,” 
may not be envisioned by most donors.  Id. 
13See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.   
14Id.   
15Michelle Goodwin, Op-Ed., Commerce in Cadavers Open Secret, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
March 11, 2004. 
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the open market.16  As many as 800 cadavers donated to the institution for medical 
research had been transferred to private companies for use in the medical parts and 
device industry in exchange for monetary fees.17  There is no shortage of similar 
scandals.  For example, just last year, a New York dentist, two of his workers, and an 
embalmer were charged with having illegally taken and traded $4.6 million worth of 
body parts from corpses in funeral homes.18  Local prosecutors alleged that these 
four men had illegally sold human tissue taken from more than 1,000 cadavers at 
various funeral homes where consent had been forged on papers by the owners of the 
home without the next of kin’s knowledge or consent.19  
Use of cadaveric tissue is not the only industry arising out of human body parts.  
Private sales of eggs for tens of thousands of dollars have been reported.20  Sperm is 
regularly purchased and sold by fertility clinics.21  In Texas, a company now offers 
for sale fertilized eggs that potential parents can select after reviewing the college 
board scores, race, and genetic background of the egg and sperm donors.22  Yet, 
despite the reproductive industry’s growth, there is virtually no regulation of fertility 
clinics and their use of reproductive body parts.   
Similarly, research participants or patients undergoing surgery are treated as 
donors (with no remuneration) when their tissue or other parts are extracted during 
medical treatment.23  Those body parts may then be used for biomedical research and 
product development.24  In the most famous case to date, John Moore filed suit after 
discovering that his doctor had developed and patented an extremely profitable cell 
                                                                
16Id. 
17Id. 
18Robyn S. Shapiro, Mining the Human Body:  Biotech advances demand new laws 
regulating the trade in cadavers, LEGAL TIMES, May 17, 2004. 
19Michael Brick, 4 Men Charged in What Officials Call a $4.6 Million Trade in Human 
Body Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006.  Perhaps even more disturbing than the lack of 
consent is the fact that “no medical precautions were taken to ensure that these transplants 
were free from disease,” and these men often lowered the age of the deceased and altered the 
cause of death “to make the tissue appear more promising for transplant or therapy.”  Id.  
Such scandals are by no means new.  England and the United States faced similar scandals 
in the Nineteenth Century when a market for cadavers for anatomy lab developed.  Two 
Scotsmen, William Burke and William Hare even went so far as to commit murder (not just 
disinter the recently buried) in order to provide fresh bodies to anatomists and universities.  
RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 9-10 (1981); Shapiro, supra note 18.  
20Goodwin, supra note 6, at 390-91 (describing the purchase of eggs in the United States 
from a website selling model eggs for as much as $50,000 and United Kingdom egg sales).. 
21Id. 
22Rob Stein, ‘Embryo Bank’ Stirs Ethics Fears:  Firm Lets Clients Pick Among Fertilized 
Eggs, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2007, at A1. 
23Donna Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue:  A Proposal for Federal Recognition of 
Human Research Participant’s Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 W. & L. L. 
REV. 257, 270 (2004).  See also LORI ANDREWS AND DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BIZARRE:  THE 
MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE 24-41 (2001). 
24Id. 
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line initially named after him as the Mo-cell line,25 which had a market potential to 
generate up to $3 billion in proceeds by 1990.26  His cells had been taken and used 
for research without his knowledge or consent during his treatment for hairy cell 
leukemia at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center.  When Moore 
sued alleging an ownership right in his body parts, a strongly divided California 
Supreme Court sided with the emerging biotech industry and awarded him no legal 
ownership interest in his body parts.27 
Organs represent one of the most highly regulated of the fields using body parts 
and one of the more publicly visible uses of body parts.28  The first successful organ 
transplantation between living brothers took place in 1954 and the first from a 
deceased donor took place in 1962.29  Organ transplantation over the last fifty years 
has prolonged thousands of lives.  As of the spring of 2006, medical teams had 
transplanted over 390,000 organs since 1988.30  During 2005, 7593 deceased donors 
“provided 23,249 transplanted organs in the United States alone, and there were 
6,896 living donors.”31  The waiting list, however, continues to grow, and the 
difference between supply and demand keeps widening as a result.32  In 2005 alone, 
for example, 44,619 candidates were added to the kidney transplant waiting list.33  
Many individuals die each year while waiting for a transplant.  These deaths, which 
                                                                
25Defendants later renamed the cell line to avoid detection by John Moore.  Moore, 249 
Cal. Rptr. at 500; see also Gitter, supra note 23, at n. 63. 
26Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498; see also Gitter, supra note 23, at n. 274. 
27Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see also discussion of 
Moore in ANDREWS & NELKIN, BODY BIZARRE, supra note 23, at 27-36, and discussion in 
Rao, supra note 3.  More recently, the National Research Council (“NRC”) in 2005 issued 
Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research which recommend that researchers 
make no payment “in cash or in kind, to any person who donates tissue for stem cell research, 
including eggs, sperm, adult cells, or frozen early-stage embryos stored at in vitro fertilization 
clinics.”  Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49 
ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 45 (2007). 
28Blood, through its use in transfusions, is obviously far more common and, therefore, 
more visible.  Despite some controversy over paying for blood, the systems for blood donation 
and disbursement through the Red Cross and other blood banks are fairly well established and 
uncontroversial at this moment in time—with most blood donated today; whereas, prior to the 
1970s, most blood was purchased.  But payment for blood is still not unheard of and has 
continued under certain circumstances.  Jennifer Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 
VA. L. REV. 163, 172 (2000) (citing several studies).   
29ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 18. 
30Id. at 15. 
31Id. at 15, 46 (citing National Data Reports on OPTN website, at http://www.optn.org).  
This data is continuously updated and revised. 
32Id. at 1-2, 15-16, 46. 
33Id. at 16.  Those awaiting kidney transplants make up approximately seventy plus 
percent of the waiting list and, thus, are the dominant factor in the growing need for organs.  
Id. at 46. 
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result from the inadequate organ supply, have led to multiple calls for reforming the 
donation system, as well as an international black market in organs.34 
Currently in the United States, a deceased donor’s eligibility requires meeting 
neurological death criteria plus opting-in through consent given by the deceased 
prior to death or from the next of kin after death.35  Depending on the study, only a 
small percentage of deaths each year in the United States meet the neurological death 
criteria.  The figures are approximately between 12,000 to 16,000.  Within this pool 
of potential donors, consent to donate rates vary among Organ Procurement 
Organizations (“OPOs”) from somewhere in between thirty and seventy percent.36  
Consent rates are increasing slowly with improvements in identifying candidates and 
processes for approaching and asking family members to participate in organ 
donation.  By law, hospitals must request permission from relatives to recover organs 
from deceased candidates, but there is no presumption of consent, and in the absence 
of consent, organs cannot be collected.37  
Multiple avenues for increasing the supply are being pursued.  Best practices for 
approaching families and seeking donations are constantly being refined and 
implemented.  Furthermore, gift of life initiatives are being encouraged in schools 
and workplaces and through driver education programs.  The Institute of Medicine 
(“IOM”) is advocating expanding the pool of potential donors by changing the 
criteria from neurological death to cardiovascular death.38  Yet the supply today 
remains inadequate to meet the ever increasing demand. 
Direct sale of organs for transplant is illegal.39  The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(“UAGA”), adopted in 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and amended in 1987, permits donation from cadavers for 
transplants and medical research.  All fifty states have adopted the UAGA in some 
part.  While the UAGA does not address the sale of organs or other body parts, the 
National Organ Transplant Act, enacted by the United States Congress in 1984, 
                                                                
34See supra note 8. 
35ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 22. 
36Id. at 22-25 (discussing dramatically differing consent rates among OPOs).  Each organ 
transplant center is associated with an OPO.  See discussion infra note 38 and accompanying 
text for discussion of the organ distribution system in the United States. 
37Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1314-1445 (West 1986) (requiring 
all hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds to institute “required request” policies).  
Hospital accreditation standards also require request and referral policies as part of 
accreditation.  ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 101. 
38ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 281-82.  Expanding the pool by expanding eligibility 
to include circulatory criteria could dramatically increase the pool size, but there are numerous 
challenges that must be met in order to accomplish such an expansion.  Id. at 22-25, 127-74. 
39National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. Law 98-507, 42 U.S.C. Sections 273-
274(f) make it illegal “for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects 
interstate commerce.”  For discussion of events leading up to the NOTA, see ORGAN 
DONATION, supra note 1, at 230-32.  Many states also have enacted state laws making the sale 
of organs illegal.  But note that the sale of other body parts that are renewable, such as sperm 
and blood, is not illegal.  Id. at 230. 
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expressly prohibits the sale of organs for transplant.  It does not address the sale of 
organs for other purposes or body parts other than organs, although some states 
expressly ban the sale of organs for any purpose and the sale of body parts.  Virginia, 
for example, bans the sale of any natural body part for any reason but excepts hair, 
blood, and other self-replicating body fluids.40 
Despite these efforts, organs are bought and sold on black markets.  Traffic in 
organs from executed Chinese prisoners or the poor and desperate in Brazil, Russia, 
India, and other less developed, poor nations is well documented.41  The IOM’s 2006 
report on organ donation discusses a study of individuals in Chennai, India, who sold 
kidneys to pay off debt.  Ultimately, these organ transplants resulted in poor 
outcomes for all involved.  There were complications, including sepsis, hepatitis B, 
and liver cirrhosis, as well as other complications in those who received the organs, 
and there were no long-term benefits to the donors, as their health deteriorated 
without adequate follow-up care.42  Moreover, the ability of donors to work or take 
care of their families deteriorated even further from where it had been prior to the 
loss of an organ.43  
As to the legal distribution systems, significant logistical and ethical difficulties 
arise with distributing the inadequate supply of organs in this country.  
Consequently, Congress created a highly organized system of OPOs associated with 
transplant centers.  The OPOs receive all donated organs through a distribution 
system run by a private organization under contract with the Health and Human 
Services Administration–currently, the United Network for Organ Sharing 
(“UNOS”).44 
UNOS and the OPOs have made continuous efforts to improve donor rates and 
distribute organs in a just and fair manner.  They have made slow but steady 
progress.45  Because of the slow progress, the fact that need outstrips demand, and 
the desperation of those in need, numerous alternatives in addition to the black 
                                                                
40VA CODE § 32.1-291.16. 
41See supra note 8; see also Goodwin, supra note 6, at 309 (citing Organs for Sale: 
China’s Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of Prisoners’ Rights:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the Comm. on Int’l Relations, 107th 
Cong. 24 (2001) (testimony that “the traffic in human organs, tissues, and body parts” is 
extensive and occurring in China, India, Brazil, and other countries); see also Michael Finkel, 
Complications, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001 (detailing extensive international trade of organs 
from executed Chinese prisoners supplying organs to American patients). 
42ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 274. 
43Id. 
44The UNOS, a non-profit private organization, has administered the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network (OPTN) since its inception.  ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 
20-21.  Under federal law, all OPOs and transplant centers must participate in the OPTN.  Id. 
at 20.  UNOS employs complex algorithms to allocate organs based on numerous factors, 
which it revises and updates as needed.  Id.  However, the OPTN has little involvement with 
living donor transplants and does not oversee tissue donation.  Id. at 31. 
45Id. at 104-20; 189-99.  UNOS is constantly seeking to make its system more fair.  See, 
e.g., Laura Meckler, Picking Willers:  More Kidneys for Transplants May Go to Young - 
Policy to Stress Benefit to Patient Over Length of Time on Waiting List, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 
2007, at A1. 
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market arose over time.  In the case of kidneys and livers (a small section can be 
used), for example, live donor transplants have become increasingly common.46   
While the most obvious living donors are relatives, living donations from 
complete strangers are increasing.  The Internet has proved to be a ripe universe for 
desperate individuals on the waiting list, and Internet matching websites have 
become more common.47  Desperate individuals with resources can post donor 
requests on the Internet and engage in publicity campaigns through billboards and 
local media.48  These individuals essentially throw all their resources into finding a 
willing live donor.  While, technically, they cannot pay the donor, they can 
compensate the donor for lost work time and travel, as well as hospital, medical, and 
other similar out-of-pocket expenses.  Such tactics have proved successful in a 
limited number of known cases.49   
States are starting to experiment with a variety of tactics for increasing both 
cadaveric and live donor rates.  Wisconsin gives state tax breaks to benefit organ 
donors, and dozens of states are following Wisconsin’s lead by granting $10,000 in 
tax deductions for expenses such as travel, hotel bills, and lost wages.50  
Pennsylvania passed legislation which creates a fund from $1 donations collected 
voluntarily at the time a person applies for a driver’s license or registers a vehicle.51  
                                                                
46A part of a lung lobe, the intestine, and the pancreas can also be transplanted from a 
living donor.  Also domino heart transplants can occur.  See UNOS, http://unos.org/in the 
News/factsheets.asp?fs=2 (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).   
47See, e.g., Internet Kidney Op Gets Go-Ahead, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3758392.stm. 
48See, e.g., Scott Dodd, Wanted:  Kidney Donor, Chance for Health; Mom’s Desperate Ad 
Nets Calls for Ailing Daughter, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 20, 2004, at 1A (describing a 
mother running an ad in the Sunday classifieds for more than a month for a kidney for her 
daughter and complete strangers calling and going for testing to see if they were a match); Tim 
Eaton, A Public Plea Woman with Liver Disease Seeks Help Through Billboard, CORPUS 
CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1; Paul Harasim, I Need An Organ Donor, LAS 
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 25, 2004, at 1A (describing use of personal website, media 
interviews, and billboards by individuals in need of an organ); A.J. Hostetler, UNOS Opposes 
Transplant Appeals; Board Says It’s Not Fair When Patients Solicit Organs for Themselves, 
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 2004, at A-1; Anne Marie Kilday, Organ Network 
Moves To End “Cutting In Line” Houston Man’s Use of Billboards Spurs a Push To Halt 
Donor Solicitation, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 20, 2004, at A1. 
49Forty-six donors have been matched with recipients through one website, 
MatchingDonors.com.  Joann Klimkiewicz, The Kindness of Strangers:  Foes Don’t Stop 
MatchingDonors.com from Connecting the Needy with the Generous, HARTFORD COURANT, 
Aug. 12, 2007, at Lifestyle.  Increasingly, such websites are gaining acceptance.  UNOS, for 
instance, has stepped back from its initial opposition to such matches and now takes no stance 
on how donors and recipients meet.  Id. 
50Amanda Paulson, More States Explore Tax Breaks To Benefit Organ Donors, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, OCT. 19, 2004, at 2.  Federal legislation which authorized 
grants to support similar reimbursement plans tacitly endorses such experimentation with non-
direct compensation schemes.  Id. 
51Gregory Boyd, Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 NC J.L. & TECH. 417, 459 
(2003). 
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The fund is designed to provide up to $3,000 per cadaveric donor to help the family 
with reasonable hospital, medical, and funeral expenses.52  The expenses are paid 
directly to the provider to avoid conflicting with the ban on payment for organs.53  In 
January 2002, the state fund became operational and paid $3,000 in such expenses to 
nineteen families who applied in the first six months.54  Most recently, a legislator in 
South Carolina introduced legislation that would shorten the term of a prisoner’s 
sentence if she chooses to donate an organ.55   
These methods are not without controversy.  Living donation is still ethically 
controversial because it violates one of the primary tenets of medical ethics:  “Above 
all [or first] do no harm.”56  Technically, a living donor is doing harm to herself, and 
many medical ethicists and doctors are uncomfortable with living donation unless it 
is a family member.57  Financial incentives of any sort, whether tax deductions or 
reimbursement of expenses, are also controversial because they are seen as a step 
toward commodification of the body.  
Conversely, the failure to encourage more living donation is also controversial.  
The economics of kidney transplant over dialysis is clear; despite the significant 
costs of a kidney transplant, it is significantly less expensive than ongoing dialysis 
for a patient.  Iran, for example, engaged in a program of purchasing kidneys for 
transplant.58  And, in the United States, there are many proposals for increasing 
supply through permitting monetary and other incentives.59  It is unclear, however, 
whether such incentives would increase the supply.60 
In summary, the United States enforces altruism for most donors but permits 
some minor forms of compensation.  Thus, it has allowed significant markets to 
evolve on the backs of enforced altruism.  Underneath this somewhat conflicting 
system of altruism and markets, multiple alternative systems, including black 
markets, have developed.  It is a system described as a blend of “altruism and 
commerce, . . . voluntarism and coercion; of gift, barter, and theft.”61  Unfortunately, 
                                                                
52Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Seanna Adcox, South Carolina Looks at Giving Inmates Reduced Sentences for Organ 
Donations, THE A.P., Mar. 9, 2007, at 3A. 
56TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 113 (5th 
ed. 2001). 
57While it is controversial in that it violates the do no harm ethic of doctors, from the 
donor’s perspective it is a self-regarding act that is not harming others, but helping others, and 
would be permissible under the social philosophy of John Stuart Mill, for example.  JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859). 
58ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 29, 34. 
59The list of alternatives suggested is quite broad and ranges from creating futures 
markets, to granting preferences on waiting lists to those who have consented to organ 
donation, to granting discounted insurance premiums or an estate tax credit for donors.    
60ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 242-44. 
61Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits, supra note 6, at 307 (citing Nancy Scheper-Huges, 
The Organ of Last Resort, UNESCO COURIER, July/Aug. 2001, at 50-51). 
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at times, within this system, “[i]nformation is poorly distributed if not concealed, and 
the failure to develop a social policy for the many is mitigated only by the self-help 
of the few–in particular, those few who are fittest for bargaining or litigation.”62  
Aggravating this state of affairs is the absence of a clearly articulated legal and 
ethical approach to body parts.  How to treat body parts, however, is far from 
obvious, as the case law and scholarly literature addressing body parts is 
considerably conflicted over the best approach to apply.  Each potential framework 
offers something that is appealing, but each also has difficulty in meeting all of the 
concerns that surround the body.  
III.  DIFFERING APPROACHES TO BODY PARTS 
A variety of frameworks for body parts are reviewed in turn below.  
A.  The Body As Owned Property:  Creating Markets in Body Parts 
Whether to treat the body and its parts as property has been a consistent source of 
controversy since bioethics arose as an academic field in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  Paul Ramsey, an early bioethicist, argued that the “body is so inseparable 
from the person that people should not trade in it.”  On the other hand, Joseph 
Fletcher, another renowned early bioethicist, argued that the sale of body parts does 
not necessarily implicate the overall dignity of the person because personhood is 
more than just the body:  “self-awareness, curiosity, concern for others.”63  Fletcher 
concluded, therefore, that the sale of body parts is not necessarily ethically 
objectionable.64   
Literature supporting these contradictory positions is abundant, and the debate 
continues without resolution.65  Those in favor point to the reality of a marketplace, 
commercial exchanges, and profits being made in body parts.66  Given this reality, 
supporters of property rights in the body make many justice arguments in favor of 
                                                                
62Gitter, supra note 23, at 338-39. 
6371 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT:  NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY:  OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 131-32 (1987). 
64Id. 
65Many authors have argued in favor of treating the body as property or the proper subject 
of market treatment.  See, e.g., Jennifer Mahoney, supra note 28; James F. Blumstein, Federal 
Organ Transplantation, A Time for Reassessment, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451 (1989); Lloyd 
R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs:  The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for 
Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57 (1989); Lori Andrews, My Body, My 
Property, 16 HAST. CTR. REP. 28 (1986).  On the other hand, many authors just as strenuously 
argue that the body should not be treated as property.  See, e.g., Radhika Rao, supra note 3, at 
365 (arguing for privacy treatment but, in footnote 15, listing the following opposing property 
treatment:  Stephen Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against, Property Rights in Body Parts, 11 SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y NO. 2, 259 (1994); LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 283 
(1985); and Richard Gold, Owning our Bodies:  An Examination of Property Law and 
Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167 (1995)); Paul P. Lee, The Organ Supply Dilemma, 
Acute Responses to a Chronic Shortage, 20 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 363 (1986); ALAN 
HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 3 (1997). 
66Id. 
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treating the body parts as owned products that could be exchanged for value in 
markets.67  Others, seeking to increase limited supplies of organs, argue that 
monetary or other market-based incentives are long overdue, as markets create more 
efficient delivery and distribution mechanisms and will increase a too small supply.  
Finally, philosophical and policy arguments regarding the special place property 
rights have in our legal landscape and their linkage to our notions of liberty are also 
drawn upon to support the property rights paradigm.    
On the other hand, treating body parts as property poses significant risk to our 
notions of what it means to be human by starting us on a path that virtually 
commodifies everything.  The body is one of the last places of sanctuary from a 
commodified world.  Many individuals experience visceral reactions against 
payment for human body parts.  The root of those feelings can be difficult to discern.  
For some, they may stem from a strong notion that human body parts should be held 
sacrosanct and protected from the realm of our market economy.  Regardless of their 
root, however, those feelings reveal that we are in terrain that is difficult to negotiate 
when dealing with the human body given the layers of meaning we impose on our 
bodies.  
Arguments and feelings against commodification of body parts are, in some 
sense, similar to arguments raised centuries ago against commodifying labor as 
economies in Europe moved from feudal to market systems.68  Fighting against such 
commodification is in all likelihood equally doomed given the inevitable march of 
markets.  Nonetheless, this paper seeks to protect the threatened values and to 
prevent the seemingly inevitable reification of the body as a tradeable object within 
our markets by preserving a space for something entitled to more dignity than that 
accorded widgets while accommodating the evolving and very real markets and trade 
in body parts.   
1.  Benefits of Property and Market Treatment  
Many strong arguments support those who argue in favor of a property-like 
treatment of body parts:  (1) the reality of existing markets in body parts; (2) the 
concrete and well understood rules associated with property; (3) the malleability and 
flexibility of the legal concept of property; (4) market efficiency in allocating supply 
to meet demand as well as market incentives’ potential for increasing supply; (5) 
property’s compatibility with our underlying liberal political philosophies; (6) 
making it fairer to the donors who are the only ones in a long stream of transactions 
not receiving compensation; and finally, (7) potentially enhancing the value accorded 
body parts in our market-based society.   
First, the notion that there are no markets in body parts has been debunked by 
numerous scholars.  Recent data shows that such markets not only exist, but are 
thriving.  Organ transplants, for example, have a cost.  Medicare alone spent $0.8 
billion on organ acquisition and transplantation in 2003.69  Of the fifty-nine organ 
procurement agencies operating today, at least forty sell body parts directly to for-
                                                                
67Id. 
68See, e.g., JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST (1667), AND INTRODUCTION TO PUBLICATION BY 
DAVID HAWKES (2004). 
69OTA NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 63, at 98. 
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profit firms.70  Payment is made for eggs and sperm, and, under limited 
circumstances, blood.  The tissue industry has become a billion dollar industry, not 
to mention the biotechnology industry which also derives many products, such as 
cell lines, from human body parts.  These rapidly evolving and very real markets 
demand clear and understood rules.  Part of the attraction of using property concepts 
is that it is a familiar legal field developed over centuries with ready-made concrete 
rules associated with it that can be pulled off the rack and applied to different 
situations.  
Supporters of a property/ownership based paradigm argue that the concept of 
property is not fixed or immutable but rather flexible enough to accommodate new 
functions.71  Property has evolved from a reified absolute thing, as understood by the 
eighteenth century English legal scholar Blackstone,72 to the notion commonly taught 
in law school today of a “bundle of sticks,” representing relationships between a 
subject vis-à-vis an object.73  But property is not limited to these conceptions, for 
other theorists seek to expand it further.74   
Given property’s flexibility, some legal scholars argue that property and 
associated contractual rights are best suited to protect individuals and patients today; 
whereas, the current predominant protection, the fiduciary duty owed by a doctor to 
                                                                
70Michelle Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits, supra note 6, at 383. 
71See Mahoney, supra note 28, at 202; see also Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for 
Denominators:  Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant 
Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 193 (2004) (“property rights are dynamic, ever changing. . 
. .”); Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles:  Rails-to-Trails, 
Utility Licenses, and The Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the 
Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351 (2000); STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF 
PROPERTY (1990) (property is “not a universal and immutable concept.”). 
72See Carol Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L. J. 601, 
601 (1998) (quoting Blackstone as stating:  “There is nothing which so generally strikes the 
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, 
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”).  Rose does show, 
however, that Blackstone’s understanding of property was more nuanced than the absolutist 
proposition.  Nonetheless, this conception of property is frequently attributed to his 
Commentaries and scholarship. 
73There are many differing theories and schools of property.  There are the absolutists who 
advocate a concept of property as a static reified thing; there is the prevailing model of a 
bundle of sticks; there are the essentialists who advocate that there is one single variable 
essential as a foundational principle; there are the multiple variable essentialists; and there are 
the anominalists who contend that there is no fixed content to property, but rather that it is a 
fluid concept.  See Rose, supra note 62; see also A. M. Honore, Ownership,in OXFORD ESSAYS 
IN JURISPRUDENCE 112-28 (Oxford 1961); W.N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913). 
74See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:  An Essay 100 YALE L. J. 127, 129 (1990) 
(listing a variety of property theories and also explaining her idea of a broader property theory 
based on what she contends also existed in the past that included not only “external objects 
and people’s relationships to them, but also all of those human rights, liberties, powers and 
immunities that are important for human well-being” and encompassed the inherent tension 
between the “individual and the collective”); see also MUNZER, supra note 71. 
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his or her patient, is woefully inadequate.  The patient/doctor fiduciary duty is 
limited to the relationship between the physician and the patient, and that 
relationship is fairly circumscribed by the patient’s medical needs.75  Given the 
multiple additional layers of relationships that can exist in the research and 
biomedical industry context, which extend far beyond the traditional patient/doctor 
relationship to the hospitals, health maintenance organizations, research institutions, 
tissue banks, and the like, something with more teeth than the traditional fiduciary 
duty, like property, is appealing.   
Moreover, property is linked in our political philosophy with our autonomy and 
freedom.  John Locke developed a theory of property that lies at the foundation of 
our vision of society and our markets.  Property becomes ours, under Locke’s 
reasoning, when we mix our labor with something.  That the individual “owns” his 
body is essential to this theory.76  This same theory lies at the foundation of our 
social contract that individual human beings own their own bodies and the products 
of the body such as labor, for example.77  That unique ownership creates a barrier 
between the individual and the state, a line that requires individual consent and 
acceptance of the state’s power.  Because one of our society’s bedrock foundational 
principles is a sense of autonomy derived from the same principles regarding the 
individual’s rights of ownership over the body and mixed labor products, it is easy–
by extension–to develop arguments that individuals own their bodies and can dispose 
of its parts just as they dispose of its labor.  Such a theory is attractive to many.78 
Similarly, our constitutional theories of privacy rely on earlier case law finding 
an ownership right of sorts over our persons.79  We tend to use the same spatial 
metaphors to describe our privacy and our property rights and to create “boundaries” 
                                                                
75See Gitter, supra note 23, at 306; see also Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary 
Metaphor:  Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 
21 AM. J. L. AND MED. 241, 250 (1995). 
76See Rao, supra note 3, at 367-68.  (quoting Locke as stating, “Through the Earth and all 
inferior Creatures be common to all men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person.  
This is no Body has any Right to but himself.”).  Through this ownership, Locke reasoned the 
individual owns external things that are the product of his or her body’s labor.  Yet, Locke 
viewed the ownership of the body itself as more of an inalienable trust than ownership of a 
thing.  But it was through that right that Man created things and then owned those things 
external to the body.  See id. 
77Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Biobanks and the Rights to Human Body, in THE USE OF HUMAN 
BIOBANKS–ETHICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS REPORT I, 55, 58 (M.G. 
Hansson, ed., 2001). 
78Rao, supra note 3, at 367-68.  By contrast, Kant critiqued Locke and his brand of 
utilitarianism arguing that turning the human into an object of ownership violates individual 
dignity and turns ends into objects.  Id. 
79The first case officially finding a privacy right in the Constitution is Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  In the abortion case Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
traced the privacy right back to 19th century case law, Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250 (1891).  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).  The Court in Union found a 
“right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference by others.”  Union, 141 U.S. at 251. 
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between us and the state and others.80  Thus, our liberal values of personal freedom 
and self-determination push us towards a theory of ownership in our bodies and, by 
extension, to allowing trade in our bodies. 
And in many senses we already treat body parts, such as organs and tissue, as 
property, simply incommensurable property.  We can devise in our will our body 
parts as gifts.  We cannot sell them, but we may give them away in a will, just as we 
give property away.  Such treatment in wills is typically reserved for what we deem 
to be property.81 
But perhaps most powerful are the justice arguments made in favor of the 
property rights regime.  Everyone, other than the original donor in the tissue and 
organ market, exchanges money and benefits.  What justification is there for 
segmenting out one portion of the transaction and making it non-compensable with 
money when every other transaction in the chain involves an exchange of money?82  
Some view this as simply unjust to the donor in that it is unnecessarily paternalistic 
in denying the poor, for example, the ability to exploit one of the few resources they 
may have and, thus, their freedom to use this resource as they deem fit.83 
Moreover, the poor face a double injustice in the case of organs because they 
often cannot afford or obtain insurance, and the UNOS distribution system requires 
both insurance and the ability to purchase the expensive immunosuppressant drugs 
required to prevent organ rejection.84  Thus, the poor (1) are denied payment for an 
organ if they choose to donate one and (2) cannot receive an organ if they need one.85  
Plainly, avoiding all compensation because of concerns regarding luring poor 
individuals with improper inducement does not solve the problem.  Moreover, 
alternatives for protecting individuals’ interests exist.  For example, we already pay 
research subjects for participating in studies and control for undue inducement with 
detailed informed consent procedures, thus allowing individuals to exercise their 
freedom of choice.86  
Supporters of the property paradigm further point to markets as the most efficient 
distribution system–that is a method of matching supply and demand.  They contend 
that markets have proven themselves as the most efficient distributors of goods.87  
Price systems provide proven methods to solve information and coordination 
problems.88  The current regime, in contrast, creates an anti-commons problem where 
there are multiple rights to veto donation.  “[W]here more than one entity has the 
                                                                
80Rao, supra note 3, at 423-28. 
81See Mahoney, supra note 28, at 203-04. 
82See Mahoney, supra note 28. 
83Id.; see also Gitter, supra note 23.  See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES (1996). 
84ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 236-37 (describing the “Green Screen” applied to 
potential organ recipients). 
85Gitter, supra note 23. 
86Id. 
87See Mahoney, supra note 28. 
88Id. at 197-98. 
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power to exclude others from the use of a resource,” the chances that a value-
enhancing transaction will occur is significantly decreased and an anti-commons 
problem arises.89  In essence, the recognition of too many rights hinders discoveries, 
research, and the most efficient use of resources.  If payment is permitted, however, 
those who pay are virtually always the most likely to put the paid-for resource to the 
most efficient use.90 
Moreover, alternatives to outright bans on payment exist.  For example, instead 
of banning hazardous work, we regulate it to reduce the risk.  Such regulations 
typically require clear disclosure and consent.91  But in the cordoned-off realm of 
organs, by relying on altruism alone, not only do we limit the supply to the extreme 
detriment of many, but we also bestow significant commercial gains on others.92 
Given the clear mismatch between demand and supply, some argue that 
experimentation with other paradigms, such as property, is necessary.  Clear rules, 
they argue, can prevent exploitation and respect individuals’ autonomy, just as the 
rules regarding payment to research subjects protect those subjects.   
Proponents of a property-like treatment further contend that it is far from obvious 
that payment will diminish our respect for ourselves; whereas, naysayers tend to 
argue the opposite effect.93  Many body parts such as sperm, blood, and hair can be 
and are commodified and exchanged for monetary value without violating our 
human dignity.  Monetary value is assigned to many things that have greater value 
than just the dollars and cents exchanged.  For example, we assign value to wedding 
rings, wrongful death actions, negligent diagnostic tests, and life insurance.94  We do 
not reduce these things to their monetary features alone.  To most of us their value is 
not solely commensurable in a one-to-one relationship with the monetary value 
assigned to these items.  Consequently, proponents of property treatment contend 
little in our experience suggests that we devalue something by merely attaching a 
monetary value to it.  Indeed, to the contrary, given the prevalence of market 
exchange in our society as the thread which holds us together, placing monetary 
value suggests we value it even though the monetary value may not represent its full 
meaning and value to us.  Monetary compensation, therefore, can potentially 
enhance the dignity and value of body parts.95 
                                                                
89Id. at 203; see also Wright, supra note 61.  Of course, this argument applies also if a 
property right is recognized, as many individuals may overvalue their parts and become 
holdouts—see infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
90Gitter, supra note 23. 
91Mahoney, supra note 28, at 213. 
92Id. 
93Troy Jensen, Organ procurement:  Various Legal Systems and Their Effectiveness, 22 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 555 (2000). 
94Gitter, supra note 23, at 301; Gitter argues that those who object to putting a value on 
tissue are like those who adamantly opposed life insurance when it was first proposed as 
cheapening the value of life, yet life insurance is broadly accepted today.  Id. 
95Id. at 301-02.  Indeed, there is a “strongly competing truism suggesting that which we 
reward with money is that which we value.”  Id. (citing Majorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive 
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:  An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 297, 336 (1990)). 
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2.  Shortcomings of a Property Regime for Body Parts 
Those who argue against treating the body as property are primarily concerned 
about the (1) devaluation through commodification of something that is priceless; (2) 
reification and objectification of that which is inherently subjective, and hence, the 
long-term consequences for how we view and relate to ourselves; (3) perpetuating 
injustices through accentuating the oppression of the poor or other marginal social 
groups; and (4) encouraging the sick and desperate to donate diseased parts, thus 
tainting the supply.96  Moreover, there is a primal visceral and well documented 
disgust factor regarding commerce in body parts that cannot be ignored, as it speaks 
to our feelings about ourselves as human beings.97  Each of these arguments needs to 
be fleshed out so to speak. 
The human body “is a social, ritual and metaphorical entity . . . layered with 
ideas, images, cultural meanings and personal associations.”98  Layered on top of 
those meanings is the biotechnology revolution, which is increasingly enabling the 
alteration by scientists of what we previously considered off limits to manipulation:  
nature–life and death processes.99  As this occurs, parts of what are essential for life 
are increasingly becoming modified and commodified.  For example, the United 
States Patent Office has allowed the patenting of DNA sequences,100 the building 
blocks of life itself; however,  Europe steadfastly continues to disallow the patenting 
of genes.   
We sense that the very thing that makes us human is becoming commodified.  
Through that commodification it becomes a “thing”–a reified object.  While those in 
favor of property argue that this is an outdated absolutist conception of property and 
that property really describes a set of relationships (the proverbial bundle of sticks) 
between a subject and a thing, this does not comport with everyday lived 
experiences.  In everyday life, most people relate to property as a thing or something 
to acquire, to use, and to put on display, such as an object that is to be manipulated 
and coveted.  But even accepting the bundle of sticks conception poses problems.  If 
applied to the body, viewing property as a bundle of different relationships among 
persons or other entities with respect to things is a way of disaggregating–
fragmenting the body and distributing its discrete components.  Literally and 
figuratively this conception of property alienates us from our bodies and selves as 
wholes, turning them into discrete alienable parts.101 
                                                                
96See, e.g., RICHARD TITMUS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP:  FROM HUMAN BODY TO SOCIAL 
POLICY 12-13 (1971) (arguing human sources of blood are better both on practical and ethical 
grounds if no compensation is given to the donor). 
97Mahoney, supra note 28, at 197.  Indeed, one might wonder why the NOTA’s 
prohibition on the selling of organs has not been challenged as an unconstitutional violation of 
a person’s privacy and property rights in his or her body.  The answer may arise from our 
primal feelings that the body should not be sold. 
98ANDREWS & NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR, supra note 23, at 17. 
99Andrew Trew, Regulating Life and Death:  The Modification and Commodification of 
Nature, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 271 (1998). 
100Diamond v. Charkabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
101See Rao, supra note 3. 
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The importance of our relationships with our bodies cannot be underestimated, 
for we are embodied consciousness.  We relate to the world, experience it, and 
understand it all through our bodies.  All of our experience is mediated through our 
senses and our brains (neurological processing and interpreting of the information 
our five senses take in through our bodies).102  Through the blood stream carrying 
chemical signals (e.g., hormones and neurotransmitters) and the sensory and motor 
peripheral nerves carrying signals to our brains, we depend upon our bodies for data 
to interpret and to understand the world.103  “Our minds, our consciousness, our 
thought patterns, and behavior–our very being–is ‘embodied,’ in the full sense of the 
term.”104  The body provides the very “content” that constitutes “the workings of a 
normal mind.”105  We are our bodies.106  
The IOM opines that if body parts, such as organs, are not “donated,” they are 
then “sold,” thereby becoming a “commodity.”107  When an object becomes a 
product in the market, “a social construction process occurs” as the object is 
“commoditized.”108  Legal scholar Margaret Jane Radin describes body parts as 
“contested commodities” because “we experience personal and social conflict about 
the process and the result.”109  Because our “minds exist in and for an integrated 
organism,”110 when something becomes “commodified” and a price is associated 
                                                                
102ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTE’S ERROR, EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 
90-93 (1994). 
103 Id. at 87-88. 
104Id. at 118, 234.  While there is no consensus or complete account of consciousness yet, 
there is a general consensus that consciousness is derived from our neurological systems and 
that our “experiences are embodied, and thus realized in some kind of material process.”  
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT 58 (2001).  In other words, materialism is 
the dominant view today of how we think and feel.  As Nussbaum states, ‘[w]e can happily 
state that in human beings thought and emotion are, even necessarily are, enmattered forms.”  
Id. at 59. 
105DAMASIO, supra note 102, at 226. 
106Yet, the old dualism of a separation between mind and body still exists in our thinking.  
Some argue that the failure of courts  (discussed infra in section IV) and others to 
satisfactorily answer the problem of whether and, if so, what types of rights exist in the body 
is rooted in Descarte’s mind/body dichotomy.  See, e.g., Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies:  
Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1996) 
(explaining that leaving the old mind/body dichotomy behind and thinking of the self as 
situated in the body and its parts poses significant challenges to the intellectual origins of our 
legal system). 
107ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 11. 
108RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83, at xi; see also HYDE, BODIES OF LAW, 
supra note 65 (arguing that legal thinkers should recognize and confront the constructed 
nature of their representations of the body). 
109Perhaps because “certain things outside our control are important to us and important to 
our flourishing,” such as our emotions and the feelings attached to them,” and because 
“undoubtedly some of us have such feelings toward our body parts,” we are conflicted.  
NUSSBAUM, supra note 94, at 22. 
110RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83.  
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with it as an objective good in a market place, our mind associates many different 
things with that process.111 
What are social meanings associated with trade and commerce in “goods”?  
Markets are the center and backbone of our societies.  They are a significant 
achievement of human freedom and, as many scholars have demonstrated, intimately 
connected to democratic government forms.112  Yet markets also represent the 
concept of “maximizing individual gains from trade.”113  Efficiency is the ideal and 
achieved through cost-benefit trade-offs.  What are the ramifications of associating 
notions of efficiency and cost benefit analysis to our bodies and selves for our 
understanding of our freedom, personhood, and politics?114  In Radin’s words, adding 
our bodies to the category of commensurable in monetary terms poses significant 
challenges to our conceptions of self and what it means to be human.115  It imposes a 
view of society where everything is commoditized.116  The long-term impact on our 
understandings of our relationships with ourselves and others is bound to change in 
significant and, perhaps, unforeseeable ways.  “Commodification is a kind of 
objectification or reductionism that may lead people to see themselves and each 
other as repositories of body parts with market worth rather than entities with 
dignity.”117  In other words, applying the language and concepts of the marketplace 
with which property is intimately bound to ourselves “diminish[es] our sense of 
particularity and uniqueness” and impacts “our perceptions . . . about who we are and 
what is important in our lives.”118 
In sum, the tension between personhood and thing hood is hard to reconcile or 
negotiate.119  This tension illustrates that property, while a very flexible and useful 
legal concept, is not flexible enough given its market orientation to accommodate our 
more “emotional and spiritual concerns” which are associated with the legal 
characterization of personal control over one’s body, both before and after death.120  
                                                                
111Id. at xi-xi. 
112Id. at 5.  
113Id. 
114Id. at 3. 
115Id. at 5. 
116Id. at 6-7. 
117Stephen Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, supra note 
65, at 286; see also Wendy Gordan and Sam Postbrief, Book Review, On Commodifying 
Intangibles, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 135 (1998).  
118Mahoney, supra note 28, at 207.  Yet those supporting the market theory argue that 
what we currently do is tolerate market activity but disallow market discourse.  Id.  This 
inconsistency leads to, in their views, unscrutinized and unregulated market activity that is 
ultimately more harmful and unjust than that which the discourse seeks to prevent.  Id. 
119See, e.g., Rendtorff, supra note 67 (discussing the tension between the connotations of 
commodification of the human body versus an individual’s rights over his or her body and its 
labor products). 
120R. Alto Charo, Legal Characterizations of Human Tissue, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN 
TISSUE, supra note 6, at 101, 102.  Ironically, this same loss of a bright line between body and 
mind which makes us so uncomfortable with placing prices on objects is also probably what is 
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Property does not map onto the human body in a “one to one match.”121  Because of 
these very real concerns, the IOM counsels against even pilot studies offering 
compensation for organs or tissue, as once body parts become a commodity, these 
meanings change, and there may be no turning back.122 
The property paradigm’s problems are not limited to the long-term understanding 
of ourselves as humans but also include justice and supply problems.  The justice 
arguments cut both ways.  While there are significant concerns that it is too 
paternalistic to impose limitations on what the poor or disenfranchised may do with 
their bodies by denying them one of the few assets they may have, there are equal 
concerns that, by permitting sales of body parts, the poor will be further 
disenfranchised and injustices will simply be perpetuated.  The poor may value 
money too much as they have so little of it and, thus, put their health at risk by 
selling organs while alive.123  Justice concerns cut strongly both ways, and it is 
difficult to discern which argument ought to prevail.   
As to supply issues, there are arguments that compensation encourages the sick to 
donate diseased organs, thereby tainting the supply.  Testing, which must be done in 
any event, somewhat overcomes this argument.   
There is little hard data available as to whether the supply increases or decreases 
with compensation.124  The efficient market arguments rely on free markets and their 
underpinning axiom that if demand is high, prices rise, and output rises to meet the 
higher price.  But if the price rises too far, demand will curtail itself until the 
demand, supply, and price reach an equilibrium.  Plainly, certain basic assumptions 
underlying a free market analysis do not apply to markets for body parts.125  Demand 
for organs, for example, is controlled by individuals’ health, and very few 
individuals would “choose” to die rather than pay too much for an organ.  Moreover, 
many do not perceive healthcare as a product that should be rationed out based on 
the ability to pay.  And even the desperately poor may decide not to sell their 
relatives’ organs or body parts given feelings discussed above about our bodies.  
Thus, supply is not necessarily driven by price.   
Moreover, we have a limited understanding of peoples’ motives regarding 
donation as demonstrated by the struggle to increase donation rates.  Payment and 
compensation could cause some to give and some not to give.  Indeed, the IOM is 
concerned that payment or compensation would “crowd out” altruistic giving, 
leading families that might donate to refuse to donate because their gift had been 
                                                           
causing our inescapable march towards universal commodifications.  Without an obvious 
subject/object dichotomy, we cannot find an obvious stopping point for commodification.  
Gordan & Postbrief, supra note 107, at 140-41; Radin, supra note 73. 
121Id. 
122ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 11.  While it is “difficult to articulate, concerns 
about the degradation of human dignity may explain the revulsion and repugnance that some 
experience at the prospect of the buying and selling of transplantable organs.”  Id. at 86 
(citation omitted). 
123See, id. at 231. 
124Id. at 243-44. 
125Id. at 231. 
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somehow cheapened.126  But aside from donors, doctors and nurses express 
significant discomfort in asking for organs from a grieving family through offering 
compensation.127  The skills and comfort level of those asking may impact actual 
donation more than the motives of those consenting.128  We just do not know, and we 
understand motivations poorly, as they vary significantly from person to person.  
Ultimately, the irreconcilability of the advocates and opponents of property rights 
positions, along with pressing justice and efficiency concerns, requires rethinking the 
problem beyond simply a property right or not and imagining alternative new legal 
structures.129  Many alternatives have been proposed.  Like property, they too have 
their advantages and disadvantages. 
B.  Partial Commoditization–Legislative and Regulatory Schemes 
Proposals to address human body parts are by no means limited to a pure free 
market property/commodification versus no compensation scheme.  Radin and 
others demonstrate that whether to treat body parts as a commodity is not an all or 
nothing proposition.  We have, in our current society, many instances of incomplete 
or partial commodification in that our reality is “far more complex” than just the 
polar extremes.130  Moreover, both of the extremes arguably force disrespect of 
personhood.131  Commodification does so by devaluing it, and non-commodification 
does so by reinforcing powerlessness, narrowing choices, and threatening freedom 
over one’s own body.132  Our “traditional liberal compartmentalization is at best 
oversimplified and cannot lead to the kind of answer” that is called for to solve our 
dilemma over body parts.133 
Examples of alternative compensatory schemes exist.  Our tort system and our 
workers’ compensation systems, for example, compensate individuals by attaching 
price compensation to bodies.  These systems, however, operate under liability rules, 
                                                                
126Id.  This argument is somewhat unpersuasive, as there is still a choice to make the gift 
without compensation.  An individual or family does not have to accept payment but can still 
donate.  Compensation as an incentive does not eliminate altruistic giving necessarily.  Our 
entire non-profit system, for example, is based on a benefit given to individuals who donate to 
charities–a tax deduction–in return for their gift.  If tax deductions for charitable giving were 
eliminated, there are few who would argue that this would not dramatically lessen charitable 
giving. 
127Id. at 245. 
128Donations rates between OPOs, for example, vary significantly.  See supra note 31 and 
accompanying text.  Whether the motivations of the donors differ significantly by region or 
whether the skill of those making the requests varies is unknown, but it is more likely that the 
latter impacts donation rates more than the former. 
129Gerald Dworkin & Ian Kennedy, Human Tissue:  Rights in the Body and Its Parts, 1 
Med. L. Rev. 291 (1993). 
130Id. 
131Id. at 126-27. 
132RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83. 
133Id. at xiii. 
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not property rules.134  Labor markets are another example.  Labor of the human body, 
a by-product, is bought and sold.  Yet we regulate our labor markets to balance the 
value of the work with our acknowledgement of the personhood and community of 
the participants.135  
Radin and others suggest a similarly balanced regulatory system for human body 
parts.136  In theory, some of these proposals rely on a traditional distinction drawn on 
our relationship to certain things and rights and how they are governed by either 
property rules, liability rules (e.g., tort system), or inalienability rules (cannot be sold 
or alienated).137  There is an important fourth category of things which can be 
separated and given, but not sold.  These are things that are not outside our realm of 
social intercourse but are outside of the market because they are incommensurable 
with monetary value.  This is exactly where the initial transfer of organs and tissue 
falls currently.138  However, markets operate by making things, such as objects or 
labor, commensurable with money or other items that can be exchanged.  But there 
are all sorts of market failures, such as information and coordination problems and 
free riders and holdouts, which require alternative methods of handling situations.   
Much regulation, including price regulation, safety regulation, product quality, 
and the like, addresses market failures and can be seen as “in essence partial 
commodification.”139  Within the last decade, there have been several proposals for 
more just systems that regulate body parts.  They attempt to meet both justice 
concerns regarding sharing benefits derived from body parts and, perhaps, encourage 
more efficient distribution systems while ideally avoiding some of the problems 
inherent in markets.  These proposals are legislative in nature and typically are 
hybrid models, combining property, inalienability, and liability rules.   
The proponents of government regulation contend that these proposals put to rest 
or lessen some of the arguments against commodification because government 
regulation through transparent socially articulated policies (1) lessens concerns 
regarding undue inducement of the poor by putting in place protective measures and 
(2) is less threatening to human dignity, altruism, and communitarian solidarity.140  
                                                                
134See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  See also Charlotte 
H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market:  Alternative Models for Compensating 
Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 77 (2002) (applying the three rules from 
Calebresi and Melahmed’s article to body parts). 
135See generally CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83; Harrison, supra note 134. 
136Unlike some of the regulatory proposals discussed below Radin is wary of drawing such 
bright lines. CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83, at 46-54. 
137Id. at 16-18; Harrison, supra note 134.  Alienation means that a right, attribute, or 
entitlement of some sort can be separated from its holder.  If something is inalienable it cannot 
be lost or extinguished or held by someone else. 
138CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83; see also generally MICHAEL WALTZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) (discussing 
incommensurability). 
139Calabresi & Kennedy, supra note 134.  See also Harrison, supra note 134 (applying the 
three rules from Calebresi and Melahmed’s article to body parts). 
140Dworkin & Kennedy, supra note 129, at 319. 
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Most of these proposals rest on the notion that monetary payment does not 
necessarily entail commodification if price is assessed on a collective non-market 
basis rather than in private negotiations.  Such a process applies a liability rule along 
the lines of workers’ compensation instead of a property rule.141 
Charlotte Harrison, for example, advocates a general default rule of donation for 
all research tissue but with an objective, non-market mechanism built-in after 
research use for the unusual case where samples prove to have significant 
commercial value, such as in the case of John Moore discussed in Sections II and 
IV.142  Consequently, research derived from the donated raw materials which results 
in valuable medical products would be rewarded proportionately, not simply 
included always nor excluded always.   
To reach this result, Harrison advocates a legislative solution, as she argues 
legislatures stand in the best position to make the tradeoffs between complicated 
uncertainties through a transparent process of gathering empirical evidence, 
soliciting expert advice, and holding hearings.143  This stands in contrast to the 
current process in which much tissue is donated without knowledge or consent, 
which she argues is an affront to human dignity and autonomy.144  People are treated 
as means, not ends, thereby violating many different religious and philosophical 
systems of respect for human dignity.  Through a legislative oriented process, 
however, all parties can be represented at hearings and a transparent consensus 
settled upon.  Moreover, creating some sort of transparent compensation system 
avoids the increased scrutiny and skepticism attached to a market-inalienability 
model due to the significant commercial gains and profits being reaped from human 
tissue, genetics, and other body parts.  It can eliminate the sense of injustice felt 
today where certain companies gain financial rewards by imposing some sort of 
return to the donor.145  
Legislative solutions, such as Harrison’s proposal, address some of the economic 
inefficiencies that might occur if private property rights were awarded to each 
individual in his or her respective body parts and which worried the Moore court.146  
Those inefficiencies are similar to a reverse tragedy of the commons.  Too many 
people holding private rights might prevent researchers and others from using the 
property in a way that mutually benefits the whole community, hence stifling 
research and development.147  Also, requiring individual negotiations with each 
                                                                
141NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 55, at 131-33; see also Munzer, 
supra note 71 (even as far back as the 7th and 9th century, English statutes provided specific 
amounts of financial compensation or amends in the event of a tortuous or criminal injury to 
the body). 
142Harrison, supra note 134. 
143Id. 
144Id. 
145See Donna Gitter, supra note 23. 
146See discussion of Moore in Sections II, supra and IV, infra. 
147Compare Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) with 
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg’s theory on an anti-commons problem with intellectual 
property rights and the undue burden it places on biotechnology research (1988).  Michael A. 
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individual, many who might have limited competence in the field and hold cognitive 
biases overvaluing their assets, could create huge transaction costs, enormous 
inefficiencies, and holdouts.148 
Moreover, a good deal of research uses samples from numerous individuals 
worldwide.  Identities are often unknown, making bargaining next to impossible.  
Thus, the time necessary to individually negotiate with each patient if he or she held 
an outright property right would simply foreclose much research being done today 
which requires multiple tissue samples. 
Confirming the transaction costs, the United States Office of Technology 
Assessment reported that actual compensation costs would not have a large impact 
on research but that the transaction costs would dwarf payment costs and negatively 
impact research.149  Thus, allowing or requiring individual permission from 
individuals whose tissue is used in research would be too costly from a transactional 
cost perspective.  Negotiating time and effort, compliance staff costs, and the 
likelihood of hold-outs all contribute to those costs.  Adopting a model endorsing 
pure property rights could, therefore, create transaction costs at the inception of the 
research that could seriously harm the industry and also non-profit research.150  
Proposals, like Harrison’s, attempt to address those initial costs by creating an 
alternative legislatively directed process that is not applied at the inception of 
research but after the research outcomes are known.151 
Absent some legislative or other solution, ad hoc savvy patient groups and 
individuals are implementing their own self-help contractual property rights regime.  
In one instance, for example, a group of families whose children suffered from a rare 
genetic disorder (Canavan’s disease) supplied combinations of tissue, autopsies, 
blood, urine, personal data, other pathological samples, and funding to researchers.152  
The group and the hospital, however, ultimately had significant disagreements over 
the patenting and licensing of the resulting genetic test and the manner in which it 
would be made available to the public.  Plaintiffs sued alleging unjust enrichment, 
conversion of plaintiffs’ property, fraudulent concealment, and misappropriations of 
trade secrets.  The district court, relying on Moore, rejected the conversion claim 
outright on a motion to dismiss, holding that there is no “property right in tissue.”153 
In response to this result, groups are no longer relying on informal commitments 
but requiring contractual relationships with researchers.154  For example, a non-profit 
group serving parents and individuals with a rare genetic disorder, PXE 
International, identified individuals with the disease or carriers and collected and 
                                                           
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenburg, Can Patents Deter Innovations?  The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
148Heller & Eisenburg, supra note 147, at 698.  
149Gitter, supra note 23, at n.19 (citing OTA Report). 
150Id. 
151Harrison, supra note 134. 
152Gitter, supra note 23. 
153Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 
2003). 
154Gitter, supra note 23.   
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banked tissues.155  The group entered into a contractual relationship with the 
researchers in which it would retain ownership rights in any patents.156  The group’s 
goal was to ensure broad and affordable genetic testing.157  Not surprisingly, there 
were some disputes ultimately between the university where the researchers were 
based and the PXE group.  Ultimately, they reached an agreement where they split 
royalties and PXE makes all licensing decisions.158  While such an arrangement was 
unprecedented, other groups are expected to follow suit.  The Juvenile Diabetes 
Foundation, for example, is pooling samples and creating a bio-repository.159 
This private self-help remedy is a unique public-private model that is gaining 
traction.  It can improve public health by identifying and recruiting participants by 
those most knowledgeable about the diseases.  But it assumes in the absence of 
legislation a contractual right of sorts in individuals’ tissue samples.  This model 
overcomes problems with individual negotiations by allocating the burden of 
negotiations to privately organized non-profits, which presumably benefit the entire 
group through their research.  By creating a collective benefit and not allowing all of 
the profits to be commercially reaped, but turning the profits back to the group 
through either broadly based affordable tests or other additionally funded research 
for cures, such groups potentially strengthen a sense of community and avoid the 
unseemly appearance of individuals profiting from their disease.160 
Instead of relying on such private groups, which exist only for certain diseases 
and exclude those who might not participate with the group, Harrison argues we 
should locate our approach to body parts somewhere between property rules and 
inalienability.161  She advocates a simple and straightforward liability rule.162  Unlike 
a property rule which encourages private transfers by sale or license and unlike an 
inalienability rule which forbids compensation or transfer outright, a liability rule 
permits compensation where the compensation is set by some sort of tribunal or 
agency.  Harrison, therefore, suggests what she terms an “appropriately timed non-
market mechanism for assessing value and transferring compensation to contributors 
of human tissue.”163  After a particular tissue has proved to be commercially 
successful, she advocates using the political process to develop standards that can be 
administered by an agency or tribunal to award compensation.  An analogy would be 
workers’ compensation, for example.   
Harrison’s proposal is not the only legislative remedy suggested; differing 
legislative solutions have been put forward.  Donna Gitter, for example, argues for a 
                                                                
155Id. 
156Id. 
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158Id..  Whether opponents could ultimately have the contracts voided as against public 
policy under Moore remains unseen. 
159Id. 
160Id. 
161Harrison, supra note 134. 
162Id. 
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hybrid using both property and liability rules.164  She finds Harrison’s proposal 
inadequate because it denies research participants any authority to bargain 
independently and could strip power from advocacy groups operating currently, such 
as PXE International.165  She also believes that something more than our current 
fiduciary duty and informed consent are necessary to protect individuals because 
these rights do not allow individuals to control research on their tissue.166  She likes 
the PXE International solution but believes it needs to be taken further.167  While 
transaction costs associated with a property right can be significant, failure to award 
compensation has its own costs because some refuse to give their tissue and thereby 
decrease the supply of tissue.168  She argues that the transaction costs argument is a 
nonstarter because these costs are already imbedded in the system.169  If informed 
consent, as it is theoretically envisioned, were obtained, it would take the same 
amount of bargaining and negotiating time.  Furthermore, meticulous care and record 
keeping are already required for tracking samples and their sources.  
Gitter and others argue that equity and fairness require some form of 
compensation, as researchers are permitted to own the tissue and be compensated for 
it while drug and biotechnology companies are reaping tremendous profits from 
donated raw materials.170  The lack of transparency in the current system and its 
underlying inequity is disturbing.  It calls out for reform and imposition of some 
sense of greater equity. 
Adding an element of compensation can encourage tissue donation and 
encourage groups like PXE International’s members to propose research that might 
not be done otherwise.171  Because property is a “flexible concept, not an all-or-
nothing one,”172 Gitter advocates compensation and sale of tissue for research in a 
heavily regulated market, like our securities markets.173  In response to those who 
make slippery slope arguments and raise the spectre of government takings of body 
parts, she and others, such as Radin, contend that this is not a credible argument.174  
No one seriously contends that the government or society would allow takings of 
organs, tissue, or the like.  The body could officially obtain a status akin to the home 
under the homestead laws in bankruptcy, ensuring that it could not be reached by 
debtors or sold under duress.   
                                                                
164Id.  See also Korobkin, supra note 28, at 66-67 (critiquing arguments for no 
compensation for research tissue). 
165Gitter, supra note 23.   
166Id. 
167Id. 
168Id. at 281. 
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172Mahoney, supra note 28, at 202. 
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While Harrison, Gitter, and others put forth interesting ideas, they fail to address 
or account for the political realities and difficulties that would accompany their 
implementation.  They fail to consider the weight of opinions of the American 
Society of Transplant Surgeons, which unanimously opposes the payment of any 
money for organs, even in the form of a tax incentive,175 and the medical 
establishment, as represented by the IOM, which counsels against any compensation 
of any sort for organs.176  The biotechnology and medical lobbying communities’ 
opposition to any such proposals is not an insignificant barrier because these 
interests are powerful and organized.  In contrast, the call by citizens for 
compensation has little in the way of organization and lobbying clout to back it up.   
Aside from the absence of any realistic chance of implementation, there are 
additional significant logistical problems not addressed by these proposals.  For 
example, there are often unintended consequences that must be avoided, such as 
industry capture of the regulating body.  The transaction costs of a new government 
bureaucracy are enormous and are not even discussed.  These problems, while not 
insurmountable, are so large that they make passage of anything akin to them 
unlikely.  Instead, legislatures today are often more inclined toward smaller 
incremental changes that do not create large new bureaucracies, such as limited tax 
deductions.   
C.  Trust Paradigm 
Before the enactment of the UAGA, our legal system at times referred to our 
relationship with our bodies as akin to a sacred trust.177  A trust is a legal concept.  It 
is a legal entity created under the laws of a state by a grantor for the advantage of the 
beneficiaries.178  “Confidence is reposed in one person, who is termed trustee, for the 
benefit of another, who is called the [beneficiary], respecting property which is held 
by the trustee for the benefit of the [beneficiary].”179  The subject of a trust, however, 
is typically property, such as land, securities, and other items of value.  The subject is 
a thing separate from the trustee and beneficiary that is to be managed. Ownership is 
separated into different elements and dispersed among different parties.  The trust (a 
legal entity, not a person) holds the title to the property, and the trustee manages the 
property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, but the beneficiary, who ultimately 
receives the benefits, neither owns nor controls the property.  The trustee must 
operate under the terms set forth in the initial granting document and has specific 
duties with regard to the property being managed, as well as fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries.180 
                                                                
175ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 249.  This group did state that it would be allowable 
to provide reimbursement for funeral expenses but was criticized in the press for doing so.   
176Id. at 251-52; see also Korobkin, supra note 28, at 46 (explaining overwhelming 
agreement against compensation or inducements for embryo donation to researchers). 
177See Rao, supra note 3, at 368. 
178BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  (West 6th ed. 1990). 
179Id. 
180Id. 
102 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 21:75 
How would this work with respect to our bodies and their parts?  Technically, the 
body is the subject held in trust.  But who are the grantor, the trustee, and the 
beneficiary?  These questions can be answered in a variety of different ways.  Often, 
the answer is based on religious belief.  For example, according to some Christians, 
“Our body was given to us by God and . . . he is the owner.”181  Under this belief, we 
hold the body in trust and must be good stewards over the body while in possession 
of it.  But this is not the only possible answer, and multiple possibilities can be 
imagined.   
Ultimately, our society is composed of so many different religions and beliefs 
that reliance on a trust concept, embedded in religious precepts, is unlikely to 
succeed.  Our bodies are so intertwined with who we are and how we view ourselves, 
with so many competing versions, that how we treat our bodies under the law must 
ultimately be sufficiently generic and acceptable from multiple perspectives.  The 
trust concept’s connection to certain religious beliefs is somewhat problematic, but 
the concept holds some potentially important ideas in the fiduciary relationship 
imbedded within it. Therefore, this concept will be revisited in Section VI. 
D.  Altruism and Consent–The Current U.S. Model 
Generally speaking, the United States operates under an express consent rule for 
solid organs and most tissue.182  This is an “opt-in” rule.  There is no presumption 
that an individual would give consent to donate his or her organs or tissue after 
death.  Instead he or she must have clearly demonstrated such a preference while still 
alive, or after death a next of kin must clearly grant permission.183  As discussed, 
federal legislation prohibits commercial transactions in organs,184 although recent 
legislation permits limited reimbursement of expenses incurred by living donors.185  
Thus, this opt-in consent model is based on altruism and thereby relies upon 
individuals’ notions of community and willingness to help others.   
Federal law requires hospitals to request from relatives organs of deceased 
candidates.186  All states have enacted in some form the UAGA, which gives adults 
the right to donate their organs for use upon death.187  Many jurisdictions have 
enacted an amended UAGA, which provides that relatives cannot override expressed 
intentions of donors.  Federal law and most jurisdictions continue to prohibit the sale 
of organs for transplant. 
                                                                
181See, e.g., Jacqueline L. Salmon, Calling the Flock to God, Away from the Fridge 
(quoting Steve Reynolds, pastor), WASH POST, Jan. 22, 2007, at A1. 
182NOTA, § 274e; ORGAN DONATIONS, supra note 1, at 9-10, 205.  In some states, corneas 
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185NOTA § 274f. 
186ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 101. 
187Id. at 19. 
2007-08] REDEFINING STEWARDSHIP OVER BODY PARTS 103 
Unfortunately, a number of individuals and/or their families still refuse to donate.  
The timing of the requests, if an individual has not made a prior preference known, 
makes the donation process difficult because grieving families are attempting to cope 
with what is usually an unexpected and sudden death.  Training those who make the 
requests and different methods for making requests has improved consent rates, but 
many potential organ donation candidates still do not donate under the current 
model. 
E.  Opt-Out Policies:  Presumed Consent and Routine Removal  
Actual consent, however, is not the only possible model under an altruistic 
paradigm that excludes payment for organs and tissue.188  Different approaches exist, 
such as presumed consent or routine removal.  As the name implies, presumed 
consent means a deceased individual is presumed to have consented to donate tissue 
and organs.  In order to overcome this presumption, an individual, or next of kin, 
must “opt-out” by expressly stating that the organs shall not be recovered.  In the 
absence of such an objection, an individual is deemed to have consented to 
donation.189 
For presumed consent to be valid, a number of conditions must be met.  First, the 
individuals or their families must understand the situation and know that refusal to 
consent is an acceptable option.190  Second, they must have a reasonable time to 
object and understand those time limits.  Third, they must understand how to object 
and have a relatively easy way to make their objection known.  Fourth, there can be 
no coercion, which means no negative effects on an individual if he or she 
dissents.191  Finally, the individual must be competent for consent to occur, either 
presumed or actual.192   
Other theories can support implied consent as well.  For example, society can 
simply presume consent based on what the deceased person would have decided if he 
or she had been asked–a substituted judgment of a sort.193  Or society could assume 
“on the basis of a general theory of human values or on the basis of what reasonable, 
altruistic people should and would do” that a donation should be made.194  Plainly, 
the latter version of implied consent is somewhat paternalistic because the decision is 
made for an individual rather than the individual understanding and making the 
decision.  These latter theories of consent which underlie routine removal regimes 
are similar in their effect to presumed consent, but they are distinct conceptually 
because their underpinning justifications differ significantly.195  Under this latter 
                                                                
188In Europe, the European Union Council of Europe and UNESCO human rights 
documents also prohibit direct payment for human body parts.  Harrison, supra note 134, at 
127. 
189ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 208. 
190Id. at 209. 
191Id. 
192Id. 
193Id. at 210.  
194Id.  
195Id. at 205-12. 
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understanding, just as in presumed consent, routine removal occurs unless prior or 
family objection is registered.  But, instead of presuming consent by the individual as 
the basis for donation, here the state or society presumes that society has a right to 
the organs of a deceased individual.196  This assumption is “broadly” a 
communitarian conception of society.197 
Ultimately, each of these many theories of consent speaks to how we view our 
own capabilities, and those of others and our decision-making power, that is whether 
we make decisions regarding organs and our bodies as individuals or as a 
community.  The United States generally does not practice presumed consent or 
routine removal, but there are exceptions.  Presumed consent is, in effect, practiced 
in a number of states with respect to certain body parts, such as corneas and pituitary 
glands.  Some states permit their removal during an autopsy to consider the cause of 
death.198  It is not entirely clear whether these states are, in effect, treating the organs 
as a communal form of property escheating to the state or actually assuming consent.  
The statutes have nonetheless been quite effective in creating a sufficient supply of 
these organs.199  While there is little understanding or public education about cornea 
removal, there is generally little objection given their small size and relative 
unimportance to the perceived “wholeness” of a cadaver.  It is unlikely such routine 
removal would meet with little objection if it were practiced as to all organs and 
tissue.   
Moreover, meeting the conditions of presumed consent is important.  They are so 
important that, in other countries that theoretically practice presumed consent, 
doctors and hospitals still routinely tend to ask consent from families.  That is 
presumably because silence is so difficult to interpret and because it is so difficult to 
determine whether the conditions for presumed consent have been met.200  Thus, 
actual practice, despite officially differing opt-in and opt-out policies, may not differ 
as much as is thought.  Ultimately, there appears to be a deep-seated feeling by many 
medical professionals in Western democracies that decisions about the body must be 
made by the individual or his or her next of kin and not society.201  Whether one 
system, “opt-in” or “opt-out,” has higher recovery rates is difficult to say because 
there is no consistent and reliable way in effect today to measure organ donation 
across cultures due to the absence of consistent methods and definitions.202  
                                                                
196Id. at 206. 
197Id. at 205-08. 
198Rao, supra note 3, at 380-81.  Many states have passed laws allowing the retrieval of 
corneas without consent.  A Florida court upheld Florida’s statute allowing cornea removal, 
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201ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 208, 217. 
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In the United States, given our non-communitarian health system and the fact that 
approximately 47 million Americans have no form of health insurance203 and many 
with insurance are still underinsured, there are significant fairness and equity 
concerns with an opt-out policy.  If a person cannot afford a transplant, she will not 
get one even if she needs one.  However, if she dies under the right circumstances, 
her organs could be taken and used to benefit those who can afford a transplant.  
Such inequities impose almost insurmountable justice and fairness concerns with an 
opt-out policy under our current health care system.204 
F.  Other Proposals 
Not surprisingly, there are numerous proposals for addressing body parts, 
particularly organs.  As to organs, aside from the proposals already reviewed, some 
recommend futures markets or encouraging more donations through quid pro quo 
donation schemes, such as awarding preference or priority on waiting lists for an 
organ if one has previously indicated a willingness to donate.205  Other proposals 
include granting estate tax deductions and the like.  As to tissue and DNA, there are 
recommendations for creating biobanks that not only control the samples but also 
return the benefits to the whole of society in some fashion.  Ultimately, each of these 
many proposals rests on an underlying assumption that the body is a type of 
individual property or that it is something that is not property but more communally 
based.  The absence of a consensus on how we should treat the body makes these 
proposals harder to implement. 
IV.  CASE LAW 
Legally, we approach different subject matters through laws passed by either our 
federal government or state legislatures, regulations implemented and administered 
under agencies’ legislative authority, or judge-made case law (the common law).  
Both the national and state legislatures have been reluctant to tackle the complex 
problem of how the body should be treated, with the exception of outlawing the sale 
of organs while permitting donations of organs and tissue.  Thus, they have left the 
problems to be resolved by the courts.  But, currently, there is no consensus in the 
courts over how to treat bodies.  As a result, the law in this country has still not 
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Brazil, when the country implemented an opt-out policy, eighty-three percent of one city’s 
population registered refusals and objections because of inequalities in society and distrust of 
the government.  Ultimately, the country had to change the law to bring it in line with its 
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203N.C. Aizenman and Christopher Lee, U.S. Poverty Rate Drops; Ranks of Uninsured 
Grow, WASH POST, Aug. 29, 2007, at A3. 
204ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 220. 
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answered the “deceptively simple question:  Do we own our bodies?”206  Instead, 
“[t]he law of the body [remains] in a state of confusion and chaos.”207  “Sometimes 
the body is characterized as property, sometimes it is classified as quasi-property, 
and sometimes it is not conceived as property at all, but rather as the subject of 
privacy rights.”208 
There exists no clear set of legal rules regarding bodies and their parts.209  As to 
dead bodies, the issue of how to treat them has long been debated by legal 
commentators, and the case law is without definitive resolution.  The seventeenth 
century British Scholar Lord Edward Coke opined that cadavers should be the 
property of no one based on his belief that the word cadaver was derived from the 
word caro data ermibus, meaning flesh given to works.210  His pronouncement on 
the meaning of cadaver influenced several hundred years of Anglo-American 
common law and prevented the body from being treated by the law as a type of 
property until the mid-Nineteenth Century.   
In 1856, Samuel Ruggles in a New York legal case set forth another etymological 
root of cadaver, cadare, meaning to fall.211  This new Latin scholarship, combined 
with evolving black markets for bodies during the nineteenth century as medical 
schools began to study anatomy and created a market for cadavers, led some 
American courts to recognize a right to possession of a body for burial, which they 
recognized as a property right of sorts.212  Eventually, recognizing that property 
might not be the best description of the right to a corpse for burial, some courts in the 
United States articulated a hybrid term they called quasi-property which gave 
families and friends a right to claim a corpse to effect a burial, but not for any other 
reason; whereas, other courts continued to adhere to a “no property” common law 
rule.213  As property law is state law and differs among the states, American 
jurisdictions are today divided between the “no property” jurisdictions and the 
“quasi-property” jurisdictions, with each side claiming a majority.214 
Quasi-property states allow next of kin a “right” for burial purposes.  They liken 
it to a “sacred trust” based on the reasons of “natural sentiment, affection, and 
                                                                
206R. Alta Charo, Body of Research–Ownership and Use of Human Tissue, 355(15) NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1517, 1157 (2006). 
207Rao, supra note 3, at 363; see also Hyde, supra note 65, at 4 (explaining that under 
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reverence.”215  Courts find a duty by family members to tend to the bodies of their 
next of kin, arising from these sentiments and our common humanity.  This duty 
gives rise to a right in the corpse that is not a property right but more akin to a sacred 
trust.  It is not a traditional property right because the family members do not own 
the body but merely hold the right as a sacred trust for the benefit of all family and 
friends who have an interest.216  A Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision suggests 
that the distinctions drawn between U.S. jurisdictions is more a matter of rhetoric 
than substantive rights because, to the extent it is a property right, it is one that 
resides in a trust and arises out of a duty.217  Other courts state instead that it is a 
legal fiction created to enable relatives to recover for the tort of mental distress.218 
Recent cases addressing the removal of corneas and tissue from dead bodies 
illustrate the division and confusion within the courts over how to treat body parts 
from corpses.  The Florida Supreme Court, for example, expressly ruled that there is 
no constitutionally protected interest by family members in dead bodies, thereby 
validating a Florida Statute permitting the recovery of corneas without family 
permission from bodies under the Coroner’s purview.219  The Court rejected the 
family’s due process (privacy right) and takings (property right) claims.220  
While other courts reached the same conclusion as the Florida court,221 many, 
however, articulate contrary positions.  With respect to the same subject matter, 
some courts find a property right.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, interpreting Ohio state law, ruled that next of kin have a constitutionally 
protected right in a deceased family member’s body.222  Applying Michigan law, the 
Sixth Circuit also found a right in a next of kin’s dead body that it reasoned is closely 
                                                                
215Rao, supra note 3. 
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222Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482  (6th. Cir. 1991). 
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analogous to property’s bundle of rights.223  A Missouri federal district court judge 
reasoned, in a case where parents disputed the use of their dead son’s organs for 
transplant, that both parents held a constitutional property interest (not a liberty or 
privacy interest) in the dead son’s body.224  But despite finding a property interest, 
the court proceeded to apply an analysis which found that, when the property interest 
was balanced against the state’s weighty interest in providing organs to the living, 
the property interest in the body did not prevail, and the organs could be 
recovered.225 
To date, looking at the often conflicting court opinions, the courts are treating 
each case individually without creating enduring principles to be applied in cases 
addressing bodies but, rather, relying on whatever principles they can conjure up to 
arrive at a fair outcome for the parties immediately before them.  This results in, as 
demonstrated by the cornea cases, disparate outcomes despite similar circumstances–
something our justice system seeks to avoid in the name of fairness and justice.226   
As to body parts removed from living individuals for research purposes, there is 
also no definitive statement.  The seminal case in this area is Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California.227  The Moore decision is one of the first and only cases to 
directly address ownership over tissues used for human research, and it illustrates the 
wide differences of opinion.228  John Moore discovered after years of treatment at the 
University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center for leukemia that his cells had 
been used by his doctors to develop an extremely profitable cell line for research 
purposes.229  His unique condition made his cells and the resulting cell line extremely 
valuable.  Moore, however, had never been told that his cells were being collected 
and used to develop a potential product that would be sold and from which 
biotechnology companies would reap large sums.230   
After learning that his cells had been turned into a valuable cell line, he filed a 
lawsuit arguing that he owned his body parts and that his property rights had been 
stolen and his rights violated.231  The lower court emphatically ruled that Moore had 
                                                                
223Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 
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by law.  Rao argues that NOTA’s prohibition of the sale of organs paradoxically portrays the 
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a property right in his tissue, reasoning that not awarding him that right and the 
concomitant control over his tissue it entailed would result in an “invasion of human 
privacy and dignity in the name of medical progress.”232  Moreover, the lower court 
focused on the unequal bargaining power of an individual in need of medical 
treatment with his doctor and reasoned that imbalance of power only heightened the 
invasion of the individual’s privacy.233 
In stark contrast, the California Supreme Court reversed the lower court over a 
vigorous dissent.  The Moore majority concluded that societal interests in new 
medical products trumped individuals’ interests of financial benefit from their own 
tissue.234  
The Moore court ruling is somewhat complicated by the nuances of John 
Moore’s particular legal claims.  His primary claim argued strict tort liability under a 
theory of “conversion.”  If the court granted his strict liability claim, this would 
mean that every party in the possession chain, including those researchers down the 
line who had no knowledge nor responsibility for the deception, would be liable in 
tort.  Thus, liability would attach to every person or entity that had come into 
possession of the cells regardless of their knowledge of the cell’s origins.  The 
California court expressed grave concerns that requiring scientific researchers to do 
extensive research and investigation regarding the consensual pedigree of their raw 
materials would likely stifle the, at that time, emerging bio-technology industry, 
which held, and still holds, great promise for treatments to aid all of society.235 
In addition to valuing the advancement of public health and the biotechnology 
industry over individuals’ private rights in tissue, the majority reasoned that research 
participants do not merit property rights in the inventions because they perform no 
innovative or creative work.  Finally, they reasoned that commodification of the 
human body is immoral, unethical, and contrary to our society’s values.  Moreover, 
the court reasoned that Moore’s appropriate remedy was for a breach of fiduciary 
duty and informed consent and did not, therefore, lie in property law.  They reasoned 
that the fiduciary duties owed by a doctor to a patient, properly applied, adequately 
protect the plaintiff’s interests.  Finally, the court expressly looked to the legislature 
to solve the problem stating, “if the scientific users of human cells are to be held 
liable for failing to investigate the consensual pedigree of their raw materials, we 
believe the Legislature should make that decision.”236  But neither the California 
legislature nor any other state legislature has passed legislation invalidating the 
theory in Moore that there is no property interest in the body.  
                                                           
human body as an article of commerce that lies within the purview of Congressional power 
and would otherwise be subject to sale on the market.  Rao, supra note 3. 
232Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1988). 
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236Moore, 793 P.2d 496. 
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The California court’s reliance on a doctor’s fiduciary duty to her patient as 
adequately protecting John Moore’s interests proved to be incorrect.  Fiduciary law, 
as currently applied in health care, only applies to the relationship between the 
patient and his or her doctor.  It does not cover any of the relationships down the 
chain with researchers, hospitals, or corporations who may eventually profit from an 
individual’s raw materials.  Moreover, Arato v. Avedon,237decided three years after 
Moore, took such a narrow view of a doctor’s duty of informed consent for research 
that research participants are in fact left without much in the way of remedies if 
something other than their medical interests, such as their dignity or autonomy, is 
impacted by unethical research methodologies.238  
Only a few cases following Moore directly address these issues.  Most recently, 
in Washington University v. Catalona,239 a dispute arose when a research doctor left 
his position at Washington University and took a position at a new institution.  Dr. 
Catalona sought to take with him the biological materials he had collected from his 
patients for the purpose of continuing his prostate cancer research.240  He argued that 
the materials belonged to his patients and that because many of them had signed a 
second consent form drafted by him directing that he be allowed to take the materials 
with him to his new institution, Washington University no longer had a legal interest 
in the materials.241  Washington University argued, in contrast, that because it had 
“developed, paid for, and maintained a substantial repository of tissue and serum 
samples for prostate cancer research . . .”242 and that because the initial consent forms 
were made out in the name of Washington University, not Dr. Catalona personally, 
the University owned the tissue samples.   
The court sided with the University, finding that once the patients signed an 
informed consent form donating their tissue, blood, DNA, or other biological 
materials for research purposes to the University, they surrendered all rights of 
ownership to direct the use and transfer of the materials.243  They could not come 
back later and direct a new use or ownership.   
The court’s opinion is ambiguous as to whether the patients ever had a property 
interest in their bodies.  Under one reading, they potentially had such an interest, but 
lost it when they donated the tissue for research.  Under another reading, they never 
had such an interest.244  What is clear is that the court in Catalona equated 
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Washington University’s possession and control over the research samples with 
ownership under state law and concluded that the University owned and controlled 
the removed samples.245  Under the Catalona decision, once a patient donates 
materials for research, regardless of what relationship or legal interest the individual 
had with those materials prior to donation; they become an object, similar to 
equipment, brick and mortar, or intellectual property, in which title (ownership) vests 
with the institution conducting the research.246 
In reaching its conclusion, the Catalona court relied on both the Moore case and 
one subsequent case, Greenberg  v. Miami Children’s Research Institute.247  In 
Greenberg, discussed supra in Section III.B., families with a rare genetic disorder 
believed they had an agreement with a group of researchers that, in return for their 
donation of tissue and other samples with genetic materials, the researchers would 
develop a genetic test that would be made widely available on the families’ terms.248  
The hospital and research institutions, however, gained a patent over the genetic test 
and disagreements arose between the patent holders and the families as to the manner 
in which the tests would be made broadly available and affordable.249  The families 
sued, claiming, inter alia, that their property had been unjustly used to enrich the 
researchers’ hospital and alleging conversion of property.  The lower court, citing 
Moore, reasoned that the families had no property rights in their tissue and DNA.   
As a result of the Greenberg case, as discussed in Section III.B., savvy patient 
groups are now bargaining in advance with researchers over the rights to the 
products and tools created with their tissues or genetic material.250  Whether a court 
would strike down these private contractual negotiations as against public policy 
under Moore is simply unknown. 
Organs and tissue are not the only body parts that have been addressed by courts.  
U.S. courts have taken somewhat varying positions with respect to body parts that 
are easily reproduced and separated, such as blood, sperm, and hair.  In one case, a 
court likened blood to a tangible product akin to “eggs, milk and honey,” clearly 
treating it as property and an object once separated from the body.251  Similarly, in 
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Hecht v. Superior Court,252 the court allowed sperm to be bequeathed by will, 
essentially treating the sperm as property.253   
Frozen embryos, on the other hand, have caused the courts some angst.  In Davis 
v. Davis,254 the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to treat an embryo as property.  
The court reasoned that the embryo was neither a person nor property but rather 
some sort of in-between category which required it to balance the various privacy 
interests at stake.  In Kass v. Kass,255 New York’s highest court, in contrast to the 
Tennessee court, refused to apply privacy rights to a similar frozen embryo dispute.  
The court there reasoned that the embryo was not a person for constitutional 
purposes.  Instead, the court treated the dispute over who controlled the embryo as 
one of dispositional authority to be determined by enforcement of prior contracts and 
agreements.  The New York court’s treatment of the embryo as the subject of a 
contract is compatible with a property treatment, but the court did not specifically 
endorse a property approach.256 
Recently, in California’s field of regenerative medicine, new funding regulations 
“require researchers to honor the limits set by donors of embryos or gametes on the 
kinds of work that can be done even with donated tissue that has been 
‘anonymized’—a rule consistent with a theory of property rights in tissue.”257  But as 
explained in Section VII, it does not necessarily entail a property rights regime.  This 
regulation would also be consistent with the framework set forth in Section VII of 
this paper. 
V.  REFRAMING THE DEBATE  
Ultimately, how we view and understand ourselves is at stake.  Many of our core 
values overlie the questions and answers we ask about how we treat our body parts.  
Most fundamentally, our autonomy, dignity, human liberty, and self-determination 
are at issue, but balanced against these are our sense of ourselves as part of a larger 
community and our concomitant duties to help others.  Superimposed on these issues 
are existing and quickly evolving markets and technologies and the great promises 
they hold for us.  The questions are complex and hard to answer.  Yet, given our 
nature as conscious beings with ethical sensibilities, we are compelled to ask 
questions and to attempt to develop some answers.  Moreover, we need a consistent 
framework within which to ask and answer these questions.  This is necessary not 
just to satisfy our sense of fairness and justice but also to give evolving industries 
and markets more certainty with which to plan and work.    
                                                                
252Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
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254Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
255696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1990). 
256A pregnant woman’s control over her body is another example of the courts addressing 
the complex web of relations regarding bodies and persons.  Where the pregnant woman is 
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over her body, refusing the right to remove life support, Rao, supra note 3, at 409-10.  In these 
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one of property rights.  Id. 
257Charo, supra note 206, at 1517-19. 
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In asking these questions, we must also ask what is it we need the courts and/or 
legislatures to do regarding the treatment of our bodies.  Should we seek uniform 
principles to be applied to these cases and the quickly evolving markets in tissue and 
body parts, so their treatment is clear?  Or should we continue to address them on an 
ad hoc basis state-by-state, court-by-court, attempting to apply old bodies of law, 
such as property or privacy, as best we can?  
Most parties involved would welcome some guidance, yet the consequences of 
selecting differing sets of principles are significant.  For example, if 
ownership/property is selected, a multitude of questions will arise including the 
question whether individuals can sell their organs and body parts?  Property does not 
necessarily require such treatment; we can allow ownership, but forbid sales.  But 
ownership does entail “objectness” and “thingness” and most of us associate with it a 
right to sell things or, if not sell, at least dispose of things we own as we wish.  Yet 
we do not allow individuals to give away essential organs, even if they so desire, 
because it would sanction suicide.  On the other hand, a trusteeship model might 
imply that our bodies are held in common and that there is a communal right to our 
organs after we die,258 violating some people’s sense of autonomy and control over 
their bodies.  A privacy based model would create rights of action that do not 
currently exist.  Such consequences explain, in part, why our legal system still has 
not answered the question “do we own our bodies?”259  Moreover, there is simply 
confusion as so many different concepts appear to apply in part but not in full.   
Moreover, we have strong and visceral reactions that we do not entirely 
understand or explore regarding the treatment of bodies and their parts.  Our 
relationship with our bodies is complicated and laden with many different religious 
and societal beliefs.  Science is learning more and more about how our minds are 
intimately connected with our bodies, and how our physical bodies create 
consciousness and even our sense of ethics and of being individuals.  Yet, despite 
these connections or this connectedness, we know through our experience that we 
can distance ourselves from our bodies–to be what yogis call “an observer” of our 
thoughts, our minds, our bodies, and our feelings; we are both them and can observe 
them simultaneously.  Being the observer does not entail objectifying our bodies 
necessarily, but we are certainly capable of that as well.  We can view our bodies as 
things to be adorned, sculpted, manipulated, and transformed, and we can objectify 
ourselves and others.  Yet our experience of the body “is simultaneously a perception 
of subjectivity and objectivity,” but we can also transcend our bodies and relate to 
ourselves as mere things.  Our minds are quite powerful in making distinctions and 
thrive on creating meaning from difference.  But there is a very real fear that doing 
this with body parts threatens the ambiguity we experience between our subjective 
and objective selves and turns the experience of the body into a “mere object in a 
world among other things.”260 
A successful legal conception of our bodies must both recognize its “object” 
qualities and its “subject” qualities.  Property, despite all of its malleability, cannot 
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accomplish this task, or at a minimum, it is not well suited to accomplishing this 
task, as property is inherently an object devoid of subjectivity.261 
Any treatment of the body must recognize that we relate to the world through our 
bodies.  And our bodies are an inevitable measuring stick through which we 
understand and experience everything.  As neurologist Damasio explains: 
[T]he body as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable 
frame of reference for the neural processes that we experience as the 
mind; that our very organism rather than some absolute external reality is 
used as the ground reference for the constructions we make of the world 
around us and for the construction of the ever-present sense of subjectivity 
that is part and parcel of our experiences; that our most refined thoughts 
and best actions, our greatest joys and deepest sorrows, use the body as a 
yardstick.262 
In a very important sense, objections to treating the body as property stem from 
these concepts.  Our bodies are the source of all we feel and think.  Everything we 
experience is related or processed through our bodies.  They are the root of our 
existence.  Treating them as pure objects is repugnant because it lessens the essence 
of this miracle we experience as life.  Any treatment of bodies must incorporate the 
dignity and sanctity of the body as the source of all we experience. 
In addition to accomplishing this most difficult task, any set of legal principles 
for the body must encompass a sense of autonomy, liberty, and integrity, as well as a 
sense of altruism, reciprocity, relatedness, and moral obligations and duties.  Yet, as 
discussed, differing frameworks emphasize different values, and it is difficult to 
come up with one that can accommodate these all too often competing values and 
concepts.   
Property both aids and detracts from these values.  Property aids the sense of 
autonomy in that it typically entails control–the right to possess, use, and exclude 
others, as well as to direct the disposition of.  These are core elements of the bundle 
of sticks included in the property concept.  Property also disaggregates and creates a 
conceptual system for allocating rights and responsibilities towards a resource.263  
Yet property also encompasses a dualism, which is not consistent necessarily with 
our understanding of ourselves.  Property implies something separate doing the 
owning that is distinct from the object owned.264  This separateness and 
objectification, stemming from a dualistic view of the person as separate from the 
body, is not threatening when the essence of human life is not at stake.265  While it 
allows us to create value in our markets and is a crucial tool in our arsenal for 
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valuing and trading resources,266 at the same time, this attribute is property’s 
failing.267 
Some scholars (e.g., Rao) frame the debate as necessitating a choice between a 
property or privacy paradigm.  Privacy is strongly related to property, as both create 
boundaries and protect individual autonomy.  Both are full of metaphors and 
language describing boundaries that protect the individual.  The appeal in these 
concepts, thus, stems from, among other things, the sense of a boundary, as our 
bodies constitute one of the most significant boundaries we experience between us 
and the world. 
Yet, for important reasons, the concepts of privacy and property are also quite 
distinct.  Whereas property creates the dualism and objectification described above, 
privacy envisions something that is indivisible and inextricably intertwined.268  
Property is a positive entitlement,269 endowing the individual with rights and power 
against others. Privacy, on the other hand, is a negative entitlement; it does not 
empower but, rather, circumscribes interference with personal and spiritual activities.  
Property protects market relationships; whereas, privacy protects personal spheres 
and relationships.  Privacy interests cannot be sold, separated, confiscated, or 
contracted away, but they can be balanced against competing interests.  Privacy 
interests cannot be disaggregated or objectified.  Privacy interests also end at 
death.270 
Privacy thus aligns itself well with non-commoditization and integrity of the 
individual and body.  It also connotes control, although not absolute, as it can be 
balanced against other interests.  It is, in effect, a legal characterization of the body, 
not so much as body but rather as a refuge from the state and others’ competing 
rights or demands.271 
Both concepts include and support autonomy values and are important in creating 
our sense of liberty, as well as in defining our relationships to the state.  
Consequently, we tend to lean on them when we are uncertain.  They are comforting 
when we are in unfamiliar territory regarding the conflicts that arise regarding the 
body and its parts.  Yet these new dilemmas call for a new conceptualization that can 
both continue to protect autonomy and liberty but also address our relatedness.   
Instead of looking to one particular area of the law, we should ask how we can 
construct a body of the law to address body parts.  Given the broad array of differing 
issues to be addressed and the law of unintended consequences, a broad array of 
responses will likely be necessary, and any scheme must present broad principles not 
narrow rules.  Yet the principles must be sufficient to guide analysis and outcomes to 
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the best and most just result.  What is needed is a new law of the body.  Just as we 
have, for example, labor law to govern our working relationships, we need a law to 
govern our bodies and their constituent parts.  Such a system works best if it is an 
amalgamation of legislation and judge-made law.   
Ultimately, given the principles upon which our society is founded, we must 
establish certain values that most of us can agree upon regarding our bodies.272  
Those values are autonomy (control) over our destinies (liberty) and, hence, some 
degree of control over what sorts of uses are made over our body parts once they are 
separated from us.  Dignity in the treatment of body parts is also important.  As to 
relationships and duties, a communal right and duty regarding our bodies is simply 
not part of our current culture or legal vocabulary.  It is hard to impose a duty where 
there is no coupled right.  Yet there is still a need to recognize our 
interconnectedness as a community.  Moreover, something must govern the 
relationship between the donor and the entity that receives any parts, whether it is an 
organ or tissue after death or tissue donated during a medical procedure for research.  
Autonomy itself can be seen as imposing some sort of duties upon those who work 
with, receive, or benefit from body parts. 
Stewardship often is cited as an alternative paradigm.  Stewardship is not a legal 
paradigm in and of itself,273 as there are few laws directly addressing stewardship. 
Although, in a broad sense, the law of trusts, agency, and other bodies of law that 
encompass fiduciary duties include elements of the concept of stewardship, 
stewardship, as commonly understood, entails taking care of something.  While one 
can own that which one is the steward over, ownership is not central to the concept.  
Rather, responsible management is the controlling element.  It connotes a 
relationship in which there is a duty to manage in a responsible manner.  As to 
natural resources, for example, stewardship entails managing them so as not to 
deplete them but rather to use them so that value is maximized for current and future 
generations.  
Stewardship, unlike property and privacy, can encompass subjects at both ends of 
a relationship or an object or thing at one end.  It does not necessarily imply 
objecthood without subjectivity, which property implicitly creates, nor does it 
require a subject at both ends, as privacy does.  Dignity can be read into stewardship 
because the duty to manage or use responsibly can promote the thing managed as 
being entitled to respect and dignity, whether it is a mere object or something else. 
Stewardship can also satisfy many justice concerns.  Objections to the courts’ 
solution in Greenberg and Moore arise because individuals received no benefit from 
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products created from their donations; whereas, doctors and biotechnology 
companies reaped profits.  Courts are concerned, however, with logistically giving 
patients control over their samples once donated, and rightly so.  Giving them total 
control over their samples would create a logistical nightmare and make research 
extremely difficult, thus stifling new discoveries.  Stewardship could impose duties 
on the doctors and companies to use the products in a responsible manner and to use 
them only in a manner consistent with certain principles.  It might also impose a 
responsibility to give back to the broader community, thus meeting justice concerns.  
But it would not necessarily give the original donor the power to disrupt the research 
and directly control the disposition of a research sample.  
What stewardship does not provide, however, is concrete rules.  It is merely an 
ethical precept, not a body of law.  Moreover, the liberty values of control and 
autonomy, which must be central to any body of law regarding the body and its parts, 
are not part of the concept of stewardship.   
Is there a body of law that meets all of these concerns?  Agency law offers a 
possibility.   
VI.  DEFINING STEWARDSHIP TO INCLUDE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO SOCIETY AND 
DONORS THROUGH AGENCY PRINCIPLES 
Fiduciary duties owed today contain some elements of stewardship but are 
insufficient to protect individuals’ dignity and autonomy.274  Is there a way to expand 
the concept of fiduciary duty with broader principles so as to protect dignity and 
autonomy?  What would a new duty or expanded fiduciary duty look like?  The 
concept of duty and obligation, generally, is missing in great part from much of 
contemporary American society, which is more focused on rights.  Duties tend to be 
associated in our minds with antiquated concepts that have roots in the past and past 
cultures (e.g., duties in feudalism to a liege lord).  If rooted to old modes of being, 
duty may not be particularly useful to us in formulating a solution.  But there are 
places where duty can come into play in contemporary life.  Duty is really part and 
parcel of the concept of stewardship.  It is this sense of duty that separates 
stewardship from the concept of ownership, which predominantly entails positive 
rights without concomitant duties. 
Agency law is, in part, a law of duties.275  Historically, it derives from the law of 
master and servant.276  In essence, it sets forth principles to govern a relationship.277  
As such, it is a good fit for defining stewardship because it defines the rights and 
duties within the relationship and also sets forth the mechanisms for redress if duties 
are violated.278  Additionally, agency law incorporates within the relationship aspects 
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of control and consent; the relationship must be a “consensual” one, thus respecting 
the parties’ autonomy and dignity.279 
Typically there are three categories of parties involved in an agency relationship:  
(1) a principal, (2) an agent, and (3) affected third parties.280  Essentially, agency law 
sets forth a variety of fiduciary duties that an agent owes to a principal and that a 
principal also owes to an agent.  It typically is envisioned as “encompass[ing] the 
legal consequences of consensual relationships in which one person (“the principal”) 
manifests assent that another person (the “agent”) shall, subject to the principal’s 
right to control, have power to affect the principal’s legal relationship through the 
agent’s acts and on the principal’s behalf.”281 
Within the broad confines of agency law there are “true” agency relationships 
that must meet the strict requirements of agency, but there are also what the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency refers to as “untrue” agency relationships that do not 
meet all of these prerequisites but are still governed by many of the same principles.  
Essential to a “true” agency relationship are certain requisite elements of control, 
including (1) an ability by the principal to terminate the relationship at any point and 
(2) an ability by the principal to change instructions through interim directions to an 
agent.282  Traditionally, “many people understand the law of agency . . . to appl[y] to 
situations in which one person has, or appears to have, the right to enter into 
contracts with third parties that bind a principal or in which a person has the right to 
make dispositions of another person’s property.”283  If one were to hypothesize that a 
donor or patient were the principal and anyone receiving a body part were an agent, 
agency law would not be a good fit.  The control aspect would create far too many 
problems to be accommodated in any realistic fashion.   
But, importantly, for our purposes, the reach of agency relationships is broader 
than the traditional understanding of this strict form of true agency.284  Agency 
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embraces a “broader set of relationships than might be expected” and, thus, intersects 
with many different bodies of law, for example, torts, restitution, and employment 
law.285  While all employees of a business are not necessarily true agents because 
they cannot make binding contractual rights or liabilities on behalf of their 
employers, the law of agency is still relevant because it “defines duties the employer 
and employee owe to each other, and it defines circumstances under which the 
employer is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by an employee.”286 
Another example of an “untrue” agency relationship would be a durable power of 
attorney.  This is an agency relationship created initially by a principal consenting to 
someone to act as his or her agent in the future.  Yet the actual agency relationship, 
in this instance, is only triggered by the principal’s loss of mental competence, at 
which point the principal is unable to terminate the relationship or to provide interim 
instructions.287  The control requisite to a “true” agency relationship is not present.  
Yet the agent has a duty to adhere to the initial set of instructions and other fiduciary 
duties. 
The duties of an agent, true or untrue, generally are those of a fiduciary:  general 
duties of care, competence, and diligence; a duty of good conduct; a duty to provide 
information regarding that being taken care of; and a duty of record keeping and 
accounting.288  In addition to these duties, which one could imagine easily mapping 
onto the treatment of body parts, there are also other duties:  that any benefits flow to 
the principal and not to the agent; that there be no commingling of properties of the 
agent with the principal’s assets; and that the principal is always in control and can 
terminate the relationship.  Plainly, this latter set of principles is inappropriate for 
any body parts regime.  Continuing control is impractical in almost all contexts.  The 
donor is either dead and the parts are now part of someone else and control is now in 
their purview, or it would stifle research and development of new products to allow 
such control.  The duty regarding no commingling of assets is also impractical in 
almost every context.  Furthermore, benefits do not only flow to the original donor 
(in this analogy the principal); rather, benefits may flow to all involved:  recipients, 
corporations, and society as a whole. 
Thus, while a strict and true agency relationship cannot be directly mapped onto 
the body, how we treat our body parts, once separated from the body, can be 
addressed by aspects of agency law.  We can isolate those aspects of this old body of 
law and expand upon them to meet the needs addressed in Section V.  Agency law 
can apply in a way akin to its application to durable powers of attorney.  At the time 
the power of attorney is created, there is a principal and an agent.  In the context of 
body parts, initially, as the donation or separation of the body part is occurring, there 
could exist something more akin to an agency relationship.   
After separation from the body occurs, the relationship is more “trust like” 
because there is no true agency relationship, yet the agent has a duty to follow the 
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initial guidelines set forth by the principal.  What exactly might this entail?  First, 
consent is essential to the relationship, and under our current regime, typically some 
form of consent is required.  But an agency relationship implies more than just 
consent; an element of control is also a prerequisite.  While it would be impractical 
in all instances (e.g., organ donation) to allow each principal or family to set forth 
detailed guidelines and instructions, it is, however, not impractical to imagine a set 
of principles generally applicable to all donations of tissue and organs that would be 
disclosed to the principal, as well as a range of options to choose from as to future 
uses.  The range would be something like the range of options offered to a financial 
donor to a university or school.  The donor can restrict his or her donation to certain 
purposes (e.g., athletics or musical programs only).  As long as the funds are used 
responsibly within these circumscribed categories, they meet the terms of the initial 
donation.  Likewise, people could circumscribe the future uses of their body parts.   
Of course, there are limits on the ability to designate uses.  One cannot designate, 
generally, when donating to a scholarship fund, for example, that no lesbian or 
African-American be given a scholarship.  Likewise, someone cannot prohibit the 
tissue from going to specific groups of people.  Instead, only certain types of uses 
and limitations could be allowed.  But, in this way, some limited form of control and 
autonomy is given to the individual or his or her family.  Moreover, by disclosing 
certain uses (and this would be a very limited, but broad, universe of categories), 
there is much fuller disclosure and openness about what may occur in the future to 
the body part, making the entire process more sincere and open. 
Finally, an ultimate accounting is required by agency law, which should also be 
required by stewardship.  While the accounting may not necessarily be required to 
each individual, an annual report by each organization using body parts is not out of 
the question:  something available for public inspection and widely disseminated 
explaining the ultimate uses, profits and losses, and return to society in a way for all 
to see.  Such an accounting entails something different than what is typically present 
in an annual report, such as balance sheets explaining revenues and expenses.  
Instead, it requires an accounting of the uses of the body parts and the ultimate 
benefits received from those uses. 
In order for the stewardship concept to be meaningful, any recipient organization 
of body parts would owe specific duties to society or to donors and their families.  
Adding both (1) an element of control over future uses of body parts and (2) 
requiring an accounting introduces elements of an agency relationship.  Stewardship 
as an ethical concept could be structured to incorporate these principles of agency 
law and more broadly fiduciary law as not only the right thing to do but also a 
socially expected requirement or a legal duty.  
Finally, neither stewardship nor these agency principles rule out payment or in-
kind compensation for body parts.  Monetary compensation or in-kind compensation 
(e.g., funeral expenses), if provided in this context, do not necessarily raise the fears 
expressed by those opposing an ownership/property designation.  As Radin argues, 
the real concern is that compensation is the beginning of a slippery slope, ultimately 
permitting social oppression such as turning the subject (i.e., the person) into an 
object.289  Compensation, however, can exist within frameworks other than 
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property.290  An understanding more akin to how we compensate for services, for 
example, does not necessarily lead to the feared social oppression.  If compensation 
is given, but it is given within a context of shared relationships and duties that are 
clearly enunciated instead of simply a market exchange, we can avoid the slippery 
slope to social oppression.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
“When systems fail, alternatives must be sought.”291  Ultimately neither courts 
nor the legislatures are likely to resolve the confusion surrounding the treatment of 
human body parts.  The place for answers and a resolution is most likely to stem 
from our practices, our customs, and the discourse we use in addressing our 
treatment of human body parts.  A new understanding in this context will then 
naturally filter through to the courts and legislatures as necessary. 
 Stewardship, if re-defined to incorporate familiar duties, rights, and 
relationships offers one possible framework.  Turning to stewardship, however, 
requires much work to flesh out the concept and give its framework significant 
substance.  One possible avenue for developing concrete guidelines and new 
institutions to support the ethical concept of stewardship are those defined above:  
requiring certain specific duties, including some element of initial designation about 
future uses within narrow limits, and an ultimate accounting to society of the 
treatment and uses made.  By no means is this the only path, but it is useful because 
it can accommodate a wide range of values, including a limited, but still viable, 
autonomy and, simultaneously, a sense of relatedness through mutual obligations. 
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